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The core of value created by private equity (PE) investors in leveraged buyouts (LBOs) has 
increasingly shifted from financial and governance engineering towards value created by 
operational and strategic improvements. Winners are no longer made in the deal-making 
period, but instead PE investors are taking an increasingly active approach to managing their 
portfolio companies.  
This study will focus on an aspect deemed important in PE, namely the planning and 
management of the period imminently after the closing of the deal. Concepts such as “100-
day program” and “honeymoon period” have found their way into PE literature from that of 
M&As, and are widely used by PE practitioners. However, from an academic perspective, 
what the planning and management of the post-deal honeymoon period entails in the LBO 
setting is still unclear. 
The study aims to provide answers to the question: “How should a private equity investor 
plan and manage the post-deal honeymoon period in a leveraged buyout?” First, a 
conceptual framework is created by reviewing the current academic literature on the subject. 
Using case study as the research method, the empirical part of the study investigates the 
approaches used by one Finnish PE investor in five of its portfolio companies. Finally, based 
on the findings, guidelines are provided for the case PE investor and other PE investors 
alike. 
They key academic contributions of this study include: 
 Synthesizing the existing literature on private equity buyouts, value creation in 
buyouts, and planning and managing the post-deal honeymoon period.  
 Creating a categorization of the activities and themes related to the planning and 
management of the post-deal honeymoon period in PE buyouts. 
 Building a better understanding of the key challenges and issues related to the start 
of the holding period. 
 Making generalizable recommendations to private equity professionals on how to 
ensure an efficient start to the holding period. 
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Pääomasijoittajien tekemissä LBO-tyyppisissä, suureksi osaksi lainapääomalla rahoitetuissa 
yritysostoissa, yhä isompi osa arvonmuodostuksesta syntyy operationaalisten ja strategisten 
parannusten kautta talous- ja governanssisuunnittelun sijaan. Tästä syystä pääomasijoittajat 
ottavat enenevissä määrin aktiivisen roolin portfolioyritystensä toiminnassa. 
Tämä tutkimus keskittyy pääomasijoittajien tekemien yritysostojen kannalta erittäin tärkeään 
ajanjaksoon heti tehdyn kaupan jälkeen. Konseptit, kuten “100 päivän suunnitelma” ja 
“kuherruskuukausi” (honeymoon period), ovat rantautuneet pääomasijoitusmaailmaan 
M&A-kirjallisuuden puolelta. Akateemisesta näkökulmasta on kuitenkin epäselvää, mitä 
LBO-tyyppisen yrityskaupanjälkeisen kuherruskuukauden suunnittelu ja johtaminen 
sisältävät. 
Tutkimus pyrkii vastaamaan kysymykseen, “Kuinka pääomasijoittajan tulisi suunnitella ja 
johtaa LBO-tyyppisen yrityskaupan jälkeinen kuherruskuukausi?” Tämänhetkisen 
akateemisen kirjallisuuden pohjalta luodaan ensin konseptuaalinen viitekehys aiheen 
tutkimiselle. Tämän jälkeen empiirinen osio tutkii case-tutkimusmenetelmän avulla erään 
suomalaisen pääomasijoittajan käyttämiä toimintatapoja sen viidessä portfolioyrityksessä. 
Lopuksi tutkimus tekee tulosten pohjalta suosituksia niin tutkimuksen kohteena olleelle kuin 
muillekin pääomasijoittajille.  
Tutkimuksen merkittävimmiksi akateemisiksi kontribuutioiksi voidaan laskea: 
 Olemassa olevan akateemisen kirjallisuuden syntetisointi mitä tulee arvonluontiin ja 
kuherruskuukauden suunnittelun ja johtamiseen LBO-tyyppisissä yrityskaupoissa 
 Kuherruskuukauden suunnitteluun ja johtamiseen liittyvien aktiviteettien ja 
teemojen kategorisoinnin luominen 
 Ymmärryksen lisääminen portfolioyrityksen omistusperiodin alkuun liittyvien 
haasteiden osalta 
 Yleistettävissä olevien suositusten tekeminen pääomasijoittajille, kuinka varmistaa 
hyvä ja tehokas alku omistusperiodille. 
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1. Introduction 
“Once you buy a company, you are married. You are married to that 
company. It’s a lot harder to sell a company than it is to buy a company. 
People always call and congratulate us when we buy a company. I say, 
‘Look, don’t congratulate us when we buy a company, congratulate us 
when we sell it. Because any fool can overpay and buy a company, as 
long as money will last to buy it.’ Our job really begins the day we buy 
the company, and we start working with the management, we start 
working with where this company is headed.” 
Henry R. Kravis, Financier and Investor 
1.1. Background of Research 
The core of value created by private equity (PE) investors in leveraged buyouts (LBOs) has 
increasingly shifted from financial and governance engineering towards value created by 
operational and strategic improvements (Achleitner, Braun, & Engel, 2010; Ernst&Young, 
2012; Heel & Kehoe, 2005; Klier, Welge, & Harrigan, 2009; Loos, 2005). Winners are no 
longer made in the deal-making period, and thus, PE investors are taking a much more active 
and hands-on approach to managing their portfolio companies. This shift into activist 
ownership naturally creates a pressure for investors to develop a wider set of capabilities and 
competencies, one encompassing areas such as strategic and change management, industry, 
operations and process expertize, and leadership.  
Despite this shift in value creation, academic work on private equity and LBOs has largely 
concentrated on describing the finance and governance aspects of buyouts. Merely noting 
that PE investors are increasingly involved in the strategic and operational level decision-
making is not enough; more effort ought to be directed into researching the management and 
leadership practices used by PE investors to actively develop their portfolio companies 
during the post-deal holding period. What we need now is an extension from ‘what’ is done 
into ‘how’ it is done. 
When comparing to the state of research in private equity to e.g. that of mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A), it is clear how big the research gaps are in the field of PE. While M&A 
researchers have long ago established a considerable theory-base on best practices related to 
post-deal integration planning and management (see e.g. McSweeney & Happonen, 2012, 
and Teerikangas & Joseph, 2012, for overviews), the literature on private equity doesn’t do 
so much as scratch the surface on how PE professionals go about producing the value 
creating changes in their newly acquired portfolio companies. How and when do they plan 
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and implement the operational and strategic improvements? How do they ensure that the 
holding period gets off to an optimal start? How do best practices in PE post-deal planning 
and management differ from those in M&A? As Heel and Kehoe (2005) put it: “A standard 
active-ownership process that applies and develops best practices is the next step for private 
equity industry.” 
This study will focus on an aspect that has been deemed important in both PE and M&A 
worlds, namely the planning and management of the period imminently after the closing of 
the deal. Concepts such as “100-day program” and “honeymoon period” have found their 
way into PE literature (e.g. Heel & Kehoe, 2005; Matthews et al., 2009a; Schwetzler, 2007) 
from that of M&As, and are widely used by PE practitioners – at least on the level of thought. 
However, what the planning and management of the post-deal honeymoon period entails in 
the LBO setting is still unclear. This is also the case for Deep Blue (name changed), a 
Finnish activist private equity investor, which, despite acknowledging the critical importance 
of the post-deal honeymoon period for the success of its investments as a whole, is yet to 
develop common and standardized internal practices in this arena. The theoretical 
frameworks developed here based on the findings from the current academic literature and 
the empirical case studies on five of Deep Blue’s portfolio companies, will serve as tools for 
Deep Blue to systematize its work and learning processes. This will enable the company to 
further develop its capabilities in planning and managing the post-deal honeymoon period, 
and by so doing increase the likelihood of successful future investments.  
The study will be of interest not only to Deep Blue, but also to other private equity 
practitioners and to academics, as this will be the first broad-scale work on the subject. The 
study will pave the way towards a deeper understanding of the practices used in planning 
and managing the post-deal honeymoon period, and of what lies behind the value creation in 
LBOs.  
1.2. Research Problem and Research Questions 
When acquiring a company, the challenge for any PE investor, in addition to negotiating a 
favorable price and advantageous terms, is to create a solid foundation for the holding period. 
This encompasses a wide variety of aspects, such as building personal relationships and trust 
between the management and the new owners, agreeing on governance related issues, and 
developing an initial vision on how the company will be developed further. This particularly 
crucial period continues during the first months of the holding period, when i.a. more 
detailed business plans are being forged, first changes are being implemented, new operating 
models are tested and the new relationships are being put to a test.  
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With so many changes and activities taking place during the post-deal honeymoon period, it 
is obvious that the process needs to be planned and managed to ensure success. The general 
research problem for the study can thus be formulated as follows. 
Research question: 
How should a private equity investor plan and manage the post-deal 
honeymoon period in a leveraged buyout? 
The research problem can be dissected into three distinct sub-questions as follows:  
Sub-question 1: 
Based on the current academic literature, how do private equity companies 
create value in leveraged buyouts, and what are the key issues with regard to 
planning and managing the post-deal honeymoon period? 
Sub-question 2: 
Based on the empirical case studies, what are the current approaches to 
planning and managing the post-deal honeymoon period used by Deep Blue, 
and how successful have they been from the firm's partners' and the portfolio 
companies' management team's perspectives?  
Sub-question 3: 
Based on the theoretical and empirical findings, how should Deep Blue and 
other PE investors plan and manage the post-deal honeymoon period when 
acquiring a new portfolio company? 
These sub-questions give rise to three distinct parts in the study. The first part aims to create 
a general understanding and conceptual framework of the subject. The work here relies on 
the current academic literature on private equity and value creation in buyouts. The second 
part, being empirical in nature, focuses on the case PE investor, and the five case portfolio 
companies. Here the goal is to understand what actions, events and changes took place in the 
individual case companies during the deal-making and post-deal honeymoon phases. The 
case studies will also shed light on how successful the measures and actions taken are seen 
to have been by the key people involved from the buyer’s as well as the management’s side. 
The third part will synthesize the first two parts, and seeks to provide guidelines for the case 
PE investor Deep Blue, and other PE investors alike.  
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1.3. Scope and Limitations 
The theoretical part of this study focuses on buyouts, not extending e.g. into the field of 
venture capital. Similarly subjects such as strategy and board work, which are clearly major 
themes in a buyout process, are discussed mainly based on how the private equity literature 
deals with them. Diving into e.g. the endless strategy literature is out of the scope of this 
study. 
To ensure the reliability of the theoretical part, a systematic search method was used to find 
relevant articles. In addition to systematically searching for literature from relevant journals, 
databases and Google Scholar, “snowballing” technique – the practice of looking for 
relevant citations in the references of each discovered article – was used until the search 
saturated into the point where it was no longer possible to unearth any new articles or 
sources on the subjects studied here.  
The empirical part also entails scope-related decisions that have an impact on the study. First 
of all, the study is limited to one single Finnish PE investor, and five of its current portfolio 
companies. Furthermore, of the people involved in these five case companies, only the 
partner-level deal team members of Deep Blue, and the top-most managers (mainly CEOs 
and CFOs) were interviewed.  
The study has a broad approach, trying to form a holistic picture of the actions and measures 
taken by private equity investors during deal making and the post-deal honeymoon periods. 
The phase “honeymoon period” is defined as the time period during which the newly united 
parties – the PE firm’s deal team, the board, and the management team – learn to work 
together, usually launch the first change initiatives with great enthusiasm, and often put 
more than average effort into the company. However, no previous research has clearly 
defined the characteristics of a honeymoon period, and for how long it generally lasts after 
the deal close. Thus the time-related scope of this study remains defined quite abstractly as 
the “months after the closing of the deal, during which it can be said that the work and 
relationships have not yet routinized in the new portfolio company.”   
1.5. Structure of the Study 
Figure 1 provides a summary of the structure of this study, and illustrates how the research 
questions relate to the individual parts of the thesis.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND 
LITERATURE 
2.1. Private Equity and LBOs 
2.2. Value Creation in LBOs 
2.3. Synthesis of the Literature Review 
4. EMPIRICAL PART: CASE STUDIES OF FIVE 
SME BUYOUTS BY A FINNISH PE INVESTOR 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.2. Case Descriptions 
4.3. Inter-case Comparison 
4.4. Results of the Case Analyses 
5. DISCUSSION 
5.1. Recommendations to Deep Blue 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
6.1. Summary of Key Findings 
6.2. Theoretical Contributions and Suggestions for 
Future Research 
6.3. Reliability, validity and Limitations of the Study 
RQ1: 
How do private equity 
companies create value in 
leveraged buyouts, and 
what are the key issues 
with regard to planning and 
managing the post-deal 
honeymoon period? 
RQ2: 
What are the current approaches 
to planning and managing the 
post-deal honeymoon period 
used by Deep Blue, and how 
successful have they been from 





Based on the theoretical and 
empirical findings, how should 
Deep Blue and other PE 
investors plan and manage the 
post-deal honeymoon period 
when acquiring a new portfolio 
company? 
Figure 1: Structure of the Study 
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2. Theoretical Background and Literature 
The second part of this study builds the theoretical foundation of the research by reviewing, 
for the relevant parts, the current academic literature on private equity and LBOs. The 
development of initial themes and conceptual frameworks used in the empirical part rest 
mainly on the theoretical background developed here.  
2.1. Private Equity and LBOs 
This section will provide the basic background knowledge of the logic of private equity and 
LBOs, examine what distinguishes PE firms as owners of a company, and form a picture of 
the buyout investment process. 
2.1.1. Introduction to Private Equity 
Private equity can be defined quite simply as: 
The provision of equity capital to companies whose shares are not listed on a 
recognized stock exchange. (Sharp, 2001) 
/?< GI@M8K< <HL@KP D8IB<K @J 8E @DGFIK8EK JFLI:< F= =LE;J =FI JK8IKLG ]IDJ 8E; GI@M8K<
middle-mark<K ]IDJ 9LK 8CJF KF ]IDJ @E ]E8E:@8C ;@JKI<JJ 8E; GL9C@: ]IDJ J<<B@E> KF
become privately owned (Fenn et al. 1997). Although such a straightforward and simple 
concept, private equity can take various different forms, and, as Sharp (2001) explains, has 
potential for great complexity. As an investment asset class private equity includes venture 
capital (seed, start-up, expansion and replacement capital) and buyout investments, as well 
as mezzanine capital, a hybrid of debt and equity financing (Loos, 2005). In this study, 
however, in accordance with the focus of the work on leveraged buyouts, the term private 
equity refers to buyouts, unless stated otherwise.   
Private equity firms raise funds from pension funds, insurance companies, investment banks 
and other institutions, as well as wealthy individuals, and then invest that money in buying, 
developing and ultimately selling businesses. Having raised a specific amount of capital, a 
fund will close to new investors. A fund’s life is usually no more than ten years, which is 
when the fund is liquidated, selling all its businesses within this preset time frame. Typically 
the holding period of any single portfolio company is 3-5 years, during which time the aim is 
to increase the equity value of the company as much as possible. A private equity firm’s 
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earlier track record of previous fund performance naturally heavily impacts its ability to raise 
money for future funds. (Loos, 2006; Sharp, 2001; Wright et al., 2009) 
Seeking to minimize risk and exercise control over the use of their money, investors set up 
constraints for the management of the fund. The fund management contracts may limit, for 
example, the target industry, size, or number of investments made by the private equity firm. 
However, once the fund is up and running and the money committed, investors usually have 
very little control over the management. Even the investor advisory councils have far less 
power and influence than a public company’s board of directors. This is why the partners of 
the private equity firms are called General Partners, and the investors in PE funds Limited 
Partners. (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2008; Loos, 2006; Sharp, 2001; Wood & Wright, 2009) 
A private equity firm is compensated in three ways. First, they earn an annual management 
fee, typically about 1.5% to 2% of capital committed. Second, subject to achieving a 
minimum rate of return for the investors, the PE firm earns a share of the profits of the fund. 
This “carried interest” is typically about 20% of all fund profits, which are mostly realized 
via capital gains of the sale of portfolio businesses. Finally, some private equity firms charge 
e.g. deal fees, monitoring fees and consultancy fees from the companies they invest in. The 
sharing of risk and reward, and realizing the bulk of their return only on exit, separates 
private equity from the major alternative private company finance, i.e., debt. (Kaplan & 
Strömberg, 2008; Sharp, 2001) 
The fact that the acquisition transactions are negotiated directly between the private equity 
firm and the target company with less regulatory issues at play, makes it possible to structure 
the investment terms to match the precise requirements of both parties, often leading to 
highly complex structures. Also, as the shares are not publicly traded, there are no given 
rules for reporting. This means that also the reporting requirements can be negotiated 
directly between company and investor. What makes the relationship between investor and 
investee company even closer is the fact that the investors are generally locked in to their 
shares until an exit through an initial public offering (IPO), or sale to a third party, making 
the investment highly illiquid. (Sharp, 2001) 
Private equity firms and the funds they manage are as rule structured as private partnerships. 
In some countries – particularly the United States – this form or organization gives them 
important tax and regulatory advantages over public companies. With flat hierarchy and little 
support staff, the firms maintain flexibility and efficiency in their internal operations. 
(Kaplan & Strömberg, 2008) 
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The flexibility of private equity, coupled with the high levels of return associated with this 
investment form, have lead to considerable growth and interest in investing in unquoted 
companies (Sharp, 2001). A substantial number of studies have found that the returns to 
investors in buyout funds continuously outperform both the returns of “strategic” buyers (i.e. 
mergers and acquisitions) and average stock market returns (e.g. Ernst&Young, 2012; Heel 
& Kehoe, 2005; Loos, 2006). 
2.1.2. Private Equity Investors as Owners of a Company  
Generally, it is possible to distinguish between two types of private equity investors, 
depending on the level of involvement during the holding period. Most firms nowadays 
belong to the group termed “interventionists” by Klier et al. (2009) (often also called 
“activists”), and have a distinctly more hands-on approach to monitoring and influencing the 
direction of the company than their peers, the “financial investors”. Whereas the purely 
financial investor only monitors its portfolio firms through e.g. management accounts, 
interventionists often participate in a multitude of ways. They are represented on the board 
of directors, in many cases a partner of the private equity firm being appointed as chairman, 
and play an active role in developing the value creation strategies in cooperation with the 
management team. (Klier et al., 2009) 
Despite the deepening involvement also in the operations of the portfolio firms, private 
equity firms are rarely involved in the day-to-day operations of the company, as they seldom 
have the expertize or time for the operational issues, and thus usually try not to step on the 
toes of the CEO. Relying primarily on the company’s management team to implement the 
jointly defined strategy, special emphasis is put on the composition of the management team 
from day one. Private equity firms don’t hesitate to swiftly make necessary replacements or 
reinforcing the management team by hiring dedicated professionals. Especially in the case of 
small and mid-size firm, PE firms seek to professionalize also the board of directors, 
bringing in industry and operations experts from their networks. (Klier et al., 2009; Nisar, 
2005)  
PE firms shift the financial focus from earnings to cash flows, as they know that earnings 
can be manipulated, whereas cash flow tells a more true story of the company’s status and 
development. High emphasis is also put on improving the reporting capabilities and 
processes in order to ensure timely and accurate information flow to support decision-
making. According to Rogers et al. (2002), private equity firms have some general 
preferences concerning the measures they track; in addition to the focus on cash, they prefer 
to calculate return on invested capital, rather than fuzzier measures like return on accounting 
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capital or return on sales. “However, managers in PE firms are careful to avoid imposing one 
set of measures across their entire portfolios, preferring to tailor measures to each business 
they hold.”  
In addition to crafting the general strategic direction in cooperation with the management 
team, private equity firms are typically also highly involved in decisions on, i.a., purchase of 
major capital items, acquisitions and disposals, and changes in capital structure (Nisar, 2005). 
They leverage their wide network of contacts with a range of companies, professionals and 
financial institutions to help the management team to run and develop their companies. Klier 
et al. (2009) go on to explain that some private equity companies build considerable industry 
expertise through the practice of dedicated industry teams. They also bring diverse expertise 
from banking, consulting and industry positions to challenge and support the management 
team in its work. An important benefit for a private equity professional of having an industry 
background is that it can build trust and empathy already from the initial negotiation stages 
onwards. Furthermore having deep industry expertise can build a reputation as an investor 
with relevant industry networks, and reduce agency costs as it enhances a firm’s ability to 
understand and control management’s decisions and actions. For example Cressy et al. 
(2007) find that industry specialization of PE firms adds substantial value by increasing the 
operating profitability of their portfolio companies, and thus drives up returns on investment.   
A number of studies have shown that active ownership adds substantial value, i.e., 
interventionists reach higher returns on their portfolios than purely financial investors (e.g. 
(Heel & Kehoe, 2005; Klier et al., 2009; Loos, 2005). Thus, partners responsible for an 
individual investment spend considerable time monitoring the company and engaging with 
the management team. Heel and Kehoe (2005) find that in the best performing deals, 
partners spend more than half of their time on the company during the first 100 days, and 
meet almost daily with top executives. This engagement is key to developing relationships 
with the management team, learning to understand the business and developing consensus 
related to strategic priorities. After the post-deal honeymoon period, the engagement levels 
naturally drop, leveling at one to two days a week over the holding period even in the most 
active group. (Heel & Kehoe, 2005; Klier et al., 2009) 
Important aspects when considering private equity firms as owners of a company are the 
implications that the investment horizon of three to five years, and the focus on possible exit 
strategies from day one, have on the setting. According to Rogers et al. (2002), the 
intermediate time frame “removes the often counterproductive focus on quarterly numbers 
yet still creates urgency to transform the business quickly”. With possible exit avenues 
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identified and targeted, some of the strategic decisions taken may seem to be against the 
general advantage of the company, but make sense in terms of value seen by possible buyers. 
Furthermore, when the holding period is drawing to a close, the owners may be unwilling to 
make significant, albeit beneficial investments, in order to “make the bride pretty”.  
2.1.3. Introduction to Leveraged Buyouts 
A leveraged buyout (LBO) can be defined as: 
A transaction in which a group of private investors, typically including 
management, purchases a significant and controlling equity stake in a public or 
non-public corporation or a corporate division, using significant debt financing, 
which it raises by borrowing against the assets and/or cash flows of the target 
firm taken private. (Loos, 2005) 
LBOs can be classified according to which parties belong to the group making the 
acquisition, and the origin of the target company. For example, in a management buyout 
(MBO) the current management seeks support from outside debt and equity providers to 
assume control of a significant portion or majority of the equity of a business from its 
previous owners. A management buy-in (MBI) then again is a form of LBO where the 
managers taking over the company are outsiders. In the other dimension a distinction can be 
made between for example public to private and private-to-private transactions, or divisional 
spin-offs and secondary buyouts. (Loos, 2005) 
Buyout acquisitions are as a rule financed with considerable debt, which improves returns on 
equity, and helps to cover the private equity firms’ high management fees. Because of this 
buyout funds target companies where high debt makes sense. Attributes like stable cash 
flows, limited capital investment requirements, at least modest future growth prospects, and 
most importantly, the possibility to improve performance in the short to medium term, 
characterize typical buyout targets. Furthermore, the company’s products or services are 
preferably well established, with strong brand power and low requirements for R&D and 
costly marketing campaigns. So being, firms in industries with rapid technological change 
are usually not attractive LBO candidates due to uncertain revenue development and 
possibly high operating demands on cash. (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2008; KKR, 1989) 
The debt used almost always includes a senior, secured loan portion arranged by a bank or 
an investment bank. According to Kaplan and Strömberg (2008), in the 1980s and 1990s, 
banks were also the primary investors in these loans, but lately, institutional investors have 
purchased a large fraction of the senior and secured loans. The debt in LBOs typically also 
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includes a junior, unsecured portion financed by either high yield bonds or mezzanine debt. 
(Kaplan & Strömberg, 2008) 
Using the capital from the fund it has collected, the private equity firm covers the remaining 
10-40% of the purchase price. The percentage varies according to how much debt leverage is 
used, and how big the stake of the management team is in the deal. Kaplan and Strömberg 
(2008) find that on average, the “CEO gets 5.4% of the equity upside (stock and options) 
while the management team as a whole gets 16%.” However, the deals may be structured in 
a way that gives the management more favorable terms and prices when acquiring shares, 
meaning that the fraction of equity contributed by the management team may be lower than 
the these figures. (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2008) 
2.1.4. The Buyout Investment Process 
On the most aggregate level, a buyout can be said to have three distinct phases: acquisition 
phase, holding period, and divestment phase (Berg & Gottschalg, 2005). The acquisition 
phase begins with target selection, in which the private equity firm screens the market for 
potential investment opportunities in line with the investment strategy and criteria the firm 
has set for buyout targets. The partners make use of their contacts and industry knowledge to 
identify potential targets, and usually try to keep the negotiations private in order to avoid 
the attention of competing buyers. Another avenue of deal flow is auctions, which may 
involve several financial and strategic buyers competing for the acquisition. Auction 
processes generally drive up the price, and thus reduce the value capturing potential for the 
buyer. (Loos, 2005) 
When initial negotiations with the company’s owners and possibly top managers have 
reached a tentative agreement on mutual interest and commitment to the deal, a Letter of 
Intent (LOI) is signed and the private equity firm starts the potentially lengthy process of due 
diligence. Typical areas covered in the due diligence are legal, financial, tax and business 
investigations, with the comprehensiveness of the process varying depending on i.a. the size, 
significance and complexity of the deal in question (Loos, 2005). During the same time the 
investors familiarize themselves with the company, and develop a business plan for the 
buyout, often in cooperation with the management team (Berg & Gottschalg, 2005). These 
plans ultimately lead to an “investment thesis”, a document summarizing the investment case 
from private equity firm’s perspective, and most importantly, pinpointing the three to five 
most critical development areas creating the foundation for growth and value creation during 
the holding period (Rogers et al., 2002). 
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Negotiations on the deal and its structure are continued during the due diligence process. 
Probably the single most important factor in this process is the valuation of the target 
company, and ultimately the acquisition price. Important decisions concerning the structure 
of the buyout, such as the degree of debt leverage, the distribution of management equity 
stakes, the design of incentive systems and so forth, are also agreed upon. The phase before 
the closing of the deal is critical also from another perspective: in case the management team 
participates in the process, this is when the foundations for the relationship and trust between 
the private equity firm’s partners and the management team are laid. Without trust and 
mutual understanding on what is going to happen after the ownership change, the outlook for 
the post-deal value creation phase cannot be said to be optimal. (Berg & Gottschalg, 2005; 
Loos, 2005) 
Once the deal is signed and closed, the company becomes one of the private equity firm’s 
portfolio companies, and thus begins the holding period. Implementation of the strategic, 
organizational and operational changes prescribed in the initial business plans begins swiftly, 
and the private equity company assumes control of the company, typically with board 
representation as the key avenue of influence on managerial decisions. In practice, the 
implementation of the development plans is often much more of an iterative as a 
straightforward process, during which the business plans are constantly updated. (Berg & 
Gottschalg, 2005) 
Being only a temporary owner, the private equity firm finally initiates the divestment phase 
to realize the returns of the investment. The typical LBO has a planned investment horizon 
of three to five years, which can be prolonged if necessary, for example due to lack of exit 
avenues or unfavorable market conditions. Historically, the most common route of exit has 
been a trade sale to a strategic buyer (38% of all exits), with secondary buyouts – i.e. a sale 
to another private equity fund, typically a bigger one – assuming second place (24%). Initial 
public offerings (IPOs), where the company is listed on a public stock exchange, account for 
14% of exits. (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2008) In case of an unsuccessful investment, 
bankruptcy procedures may take the place of the exit. Jensen (1989), however, finds that the 
nature of the buyout as a privately negotiated transaction makes it far easier to re-negotiate 
debt repayment terms and covenant levels between lenders and shareholders, and bankruptcy 
can therefore be avoided in many cases.  
Figure 2 summarizes the buyout investment process phases. 
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2.2. Value Creation in LBOs 
In the following chapters, the logic of growing the value of a company, and the general 
sources of value generation in LBOs are examined in more detail. The structure of this 
examination is based primarily on the conceptual framework and categorization of value 
creation and value capturing focus areas developed by Berg and Gottschalg (2005), 
supplemented by findings from other studies.  
2.2.1. Growing the Value of an Acquired Company: Value Definition  
From the perspective of a private equity firm, what constitutes as value generation in a 
buyout is the appreciation of the equity value of the business in question during the holding 
period. As Berg and Gottschalg (2005) show, the equity value (EV) of a company can be 
decomposed into four distinct components, leading to the following equation: 
Equity Value = Valuation Multiple * Revenues * Margin – Net Debt 
This means, that in order to grow the enterprise value of a business, private equity firms need 
to be able induce positive development in at least one of these aspects. Berg and Gottschalg 
(2005), in referring to the earlier work of Gottschalg et al. (2004), posit that based on this 
equation, a distinction between two basic classes of value generation can be made, “value 
capturing”, and “value creation”. 
The first type of value increase is captured by the valuation multiple component of the 
equation. The multiple can be affected by, e.g., changes in expectations regarding the future 
performance of the business or an entire industry, and can thus occur without any real 
change in the underlying financial performance of the business. What is essential to 
understand with regard to the idea behind value capturing is that, although a company can 
actively influence the valuation multiple by for example positioning itself well in the market 
or trying to change the industry structure through its own actions, a bulk of the increases in 
the valuation multiple may be fully unrelated to the firm’s behavior. Thus, when the value of 
a PE firm’s portfolio company increases during the holding period in part because of e.g. 
increases in the valuation multiples of comparable companies, it can be said that the PE firm 
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originates mainly from financial arbitrage based on changes in market valuation, private 
information about the company, superior market information and superior deal-making 
capabilities. (Berg & Gottschalg, 2005; Gottschalg et al., 2004) 
Value creation, on the other hand, is directly linked to fundamental changes in the financial 
performance of the business. This can be either in the form of improvements in the 
company’s revenues or margins, or reduction of capital requirements. According to Berg and 
Gottschalg (2005), “Such a change stems from factors such as improvements in operating 
performance (revenue growth, improved operating margin, etc.), reduced cost of capital 
(optimization of capital structure, better financing terms etc.), or the freeing-up of resources 
through a reduction in the required fixed or current assets.” These drivers of value creation, 
discussed in more detail in the following chapter, can be further subdivided into primary and 
secondary levers. The primary levers, with a direct bottom line effect, can be induced 
through improvements in financial engineering, operational effectiveness and strategic 
distinctiveness. The secondary levers, then again, have no direct impact on the financial 
performance or cash flow generation of a company, but can bring about enhancements in one 
or more of the primary levers. The secondary levers include factors such as reducing agency 
and supporting activities, like mentoring and use of personal networks by the private equity 
firm. (Berg & Gottschalg, 2005) 
2.2.2. Primary Levers of Value Creation in LBOs 
Financial Engineering 
Financial engineering is one of the most widely acknowledged and discussed primary levers 
of value creation in the context of leveraged buyouts. The whole concept of the acquirer 
borrowing a major portion of the purchase price from a variety of financial institutions 
highlights the significance of financial engineering. During the acquisition process, private 
equity firms use their expertise and knowledge of the capital market mechanisms to create to 
optimize the capital structure of the target company, and then continue to share their 
expertise with the company management after the deal (Anders, 1992). They use their 
reputation and intimate contacts to financial institutions to negotiate favorable terms for the 
financing, often also creating competition among the institutions to bring down the costs of 
debt (Cotter & Peck, 2001; Kaplan & Strömberg, 2008). After the ownership change, the PE 
firm often takes over most important negotiations on bank loans, bond underwritings, 
possible initial public offerings and subsequent stock sales. They, as repeat players in the 
debt markets, are likely to reduce agency costs of debt and costs of financial distress (Jensen, 
1989).  
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One major benefit of high debt leverage is the tax shield it creates (Kaplan, 1989; Singh, 
1990). Also, when increasing the portion of debt in a company’s finances, it brings down the 
company’s weighted average cost of capital (WACC), as debt has a lower cost of capital 
than equity.  
The principle disadvantage of high leverage can be said to be the fact that it increases 
exposure to external shocks and financial distress when facing for example decreases in 
demand, escalating interest rates or an economic downturn (Singh, 1990). Furthermore, high 
leverage with high financing costs can make the managers excessively risk-averse and short-
term oriented, leading to a loss of long-term competitiveness (Loos, 2005). However, a 
number of studies (i.a. Achleitner, Braun, & Engel, 2010; Brigl et al., 2008; Loos, 2006) 
examining the importance of leverage in LBOs have shown that it does play a considerable 
role in explaining the returns of private equity firms by boosting the return on equity. For 
example, in the study and sample of Achleitner et al. (2010), the leverage effect accounted 
for approximately one-third of the overall value creation, which, on the other hand, means 
that two-thirds can be attributed to operational improvements and changes in valuation 
multiples. 
Increasing Operational Effectiveness 
A substantial amount of research shows that buyouts have a positive effect on the operational 
performance of target companies (Kaplan, 1989; Lichtenberg & Siegel, 1990; Long & 
Ravenschaft, 1993; Phan & Hill, 1995; Singh, 1990). A private equity firm has a range of 
options to increase the resource efficiency and operational effectiveness of its portfolio 
companies. Berg and Gottschalg (2005) categorize these levers into “cost cutting and margin 
improvements”, “reducing capital requirements”, and “removing managerial inefficiencies”.  
Cost cutting and margin improvements 
In trying to reduce costs and improve margins private equity firms often substantially change 
the way a portfolio company’s operations are organized and managed (Muscarella & 
Vetsuypens, 1990). They initiate cost cutting programs, tighten the control on spending, 
reduce overheads, increase the degree of outsourcing, and try to cut on bureaucracy (Anders, 
1992; Easterwood et al., 1989; Kaplan, 1989; Lichtenberg & Siegel, 1990; Muscarella & 
Vetsuypens, 1990). As LBOs are likely to occur in companies with high cash flow 
generation, but possibly low alternative investment opportunities, bad investment decisions 
are often reduced because of the increased pressure of paying off debt and interests (Kaplan, 
1989). Despite general belief that LBOs result in wide dismissals of employees, studies show 
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that after the possible initial reduction in employment, employment levels actually on 
average tend to rise rapidly, especially in management buyouts (Wright et al., 2009). 
Reducing capital requirements 
In addition to cost cutting measures, private equity firms also bring about changes that 
reduce capital requirements, and release capital for growth and debt repayments. They seek 
to improve asset utilization by e.g. more effective working capital management through 
acceleration of inventory turnover and collection of receivables and through extension of 
payment periods to suppliers (Easterwood et al., 1989; Kester & Luehrman, 1995; Long & 
Ravenschaft, 1993; Muscarella & Vetsuypens, 1990; Singh, 1990). Also, divestment of low-
synergy assets and ceased spending on poor investment decisions reduces capital 
requirements. According to Bloom et al. (2009), private equity ownership is associated with 
strong operations management practices, employing lean manufacturing, continuous 
improvement and monitoring practices to a higher degree than comparable government, 
family and privately owned firms (difference to publicly listed firms also detected, but not 
statistically significant in their study). 
Easterwood et al. (1989) give a reminder, however, that restructuring an organization and 
creating large operational changes may also lead to negative consequences, and lost 
competitiveness, if orchestrated in wrong ways. Furthermore, Wright and Robbie (1996) 
hypothesize that as businesses in general are developing better practices to increase 
efficiency and cost control, the possibility for private equity firms to manufacture significant 
short-term benefits from restructuring may be dwindling. 
Removing managerial inefficiencies 
In addition to improving management practices in their portfolio companies, private equity 
firms also tend to, more often than not, make significant changes in the composition of the 
management team itself. Removing the cause of a company’s low performance by replacing 
poor performing managers can be seen as another avenue into improvements in operational 
effectiveness. (Anders, 1992; Berg & Gottschalg, 2005)  
PE firms are also known for their tendency to produce ambitious business plans and thus 
raising the standards for management performance (Baker & Montgomery, 1994). Through 
the aggressive targets and increased risk of financial distress due to higher leverage, the new 
owners are forcing portfolio company managers to work harder to reach the goals and to 
reach budgets, thereby eliminating some of the managerial inefficiencies (Anders, 1992; 
Easterwood et al., 1989). Furthermore, the changes in governance structures, aggressive 
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target setting, incentives, and increased accountability for performance generally also 
increase managers’ willingness to take even rather difficult and unpopular actions if required 
(Singh 1990). 
Increasing Strategic Distinctiveness 
Private equity firms do not only rely on operational improvements to create real value during 
the holding period, but put in great effort to form more distinctive and competitive strategies 
for their portfolio companies. LBOs often lead to redefinition of target markets, product lines, 
pricing strategies, distribution channels, and other key strategic aspects (Berg & Gottschalg, 
2005). What is commonly seen is that a company refocuses its strategy and reduces 
complexity of its organization and operations (Phan & Hill, 1995). Non-core and non-
competitive businesses are sold off (Anders, 1992; Muscarella & Vetsuypens, 1990; Singh, 
1990), and resource allocation priorities are revised to match the new strategic direction 
(Easterwood et al., 1989).  
However, important as they are, efficiency boosting strategic and operational changes are no 
longer the sole focus in LBOs (Wright et al., 2001). Strong growth is often key to high value 
creation, and e.g. Singh (1990) confirms that buyouts on average experience significantly 
higher revenue growth during the holding period than comparable publicly listed companies. 
The investment horizon being limited, buyouts often seek growth through add on 
acquisitions, where the company acts as a platform for a “buy-and-build” strategy. 
Especially in fragmented markets, a private equity firm executing this type of a strategy may 
be able to consolidate and restructure the whole market in its advantage, reap synergy 
advantages and reach a critical mass to be floated on the public stock market, or to arouse the 
interest of trade acquirers and bigger private equity firms. (Loos, 2006; Wright et al., 2001) 
Changes in a portfolio company’s strategy, despite implemented only after the acquisition, 
are often planned already before the closing of the deal, sometimes by the private equity firm 
alone, but more often in interaction with the management team. The investment thesis, 
crafted before the acquisition by the PE firm, usually outlines three to five key (strategic) 
development themes, and forms a basis for the strategic direction of the portfolio company. 
However, these plans are often subject to changes after the deal, during the holding period, 
as the portfolio company faces new opportunities and challenges, and as the partners of the 
private equity firm gain deeper understanding of the company and its markets. (Berg & 
Gottschalg, 2005) 
2.2.4. Secondary Levers of Value Creation in LBOs 
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As the previous chapters show, private equity firms strive to create value in LBOs in a 
multitude of ways, ranging from financial and operational engineering to improving the 
portfolio companies’ strategic focus. However, many of these levers have always been there, 
already before the LBO, waiting for the managers of the company to take a tug on them. 
Why then are these actions only taken after the private equity company comes along? What 
aspects of the situation change in an LBO facilitating the application of these primary value 
creation levers? Again relying on the conceptual framework and categorization of Berg and 
Gottschalg (2005), this chapter will answer these questions by introducing the secondary 
levers of value creation in LBOs. 
Reducing Agency Costs 
Agency theory argues that there is an inherent conflict within a corporation, arising from 
diverging goals of the company’s owners and their professional managers. Agency costs are 
present when “one or more persons (principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to 
perform some service on their behalf, which involves delegating some decision-making 
authority to the agent” (Berg & Gottschalg, 2005). The assumption that both parties are 
maximizing their individual utility leads to a conclusion that the agent does not always act in 
the best interest of the principal. The changes in organizational structure and ownership that 
become possible in the context of buyout allow for a significant reduction in agency costs 
arising from, i.a., misalignment of incentives between managers and owners, challenges of 
monitoring managers’ decisions and actions, and information asymmetries (Jensen, 1989; 
Sarah Kaplan, 1989; Opler & Titman, 1993).  
The three main ways of reducing agency costs in the context of LBOs – reducing agency 
costs of free cash flow, improving incentive alignment, and improving monitoring and 
controlling – are examined in closer detail below. (Berg & Gottschalg, 2005) 
Reducing Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow 
In addition to creating direct value, as discussed earlier, the financial leverage used in LBOs 
significantly limits management discretion by compelling managers to service debt payments 
rather than spending free cash flows inefficiently within the firm and on corporate 
expenditures (Jensen, 1989). The debt burden incentivizes managers to work harder, make 
better investment decision, and to run the company more efficiently, in order to avoid a 
costly bankruptcy (Cotter & Peck, 2001). 
Increased leverage also acts as an additional governance mechanism, as lenders start to 
monitor management’s actions closer to ensure the company will fulfill its repayments. The 
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repayment schedule and other debt covenants can be seen as a sort of operational budget, 
which imposes additional constraints on management’s discretion (Baker & Montgomery, 
1994; Lichtenberg & Siegel, 1990).  
Improving Incentive Alignment 
The incentive structures used in LBOs are such that there is an extremely high degree of 
incentive alignment between the investors in the fund, the PE firm, and the managers of the 
portfolio companies (Baker and Montgomery 1994). The structures rely on both “carrot” and 
“stick” mechanisms to reduce the agency conflict after the acquisition (Jensen, 1989; 
Lichtenberg & Siegel, 1990). 
In private equity firm portfolio companies managers are not only provided with bonus and 
stock option incentives, that materialize if the company performs according to or above plans, 
but are encouraged, if not forced, to become co-owners by investing a significant amount of 
their own money in the company (Baker & Montgomery, 1994; Muscarella & Vetsuypens, 
1990). This way, they do not only take part in the upside potential, but also in the possible 
downside risk, which increases the personal costs of inefficiency and failure (Berg & 
Gottschalg, 2005; Loos, 2005). Demanding substantial equity holdings from top 
management is especially suitable as an incentive system in the context of LBOs because, 
despite illiquidity during the holding period, the liquidation date is quite foreseeable due to 
the limited investment horizon (Baker & Montgomery, 1994; Kaplan & Strömberg, 2008). 
Furthermore studies, e.g. Halpern et al. (1999), indicate that LBOs have significantly higher 
managerial share ownership than those involved in traditional acquisitions of listed 
corporations. Also, firms going private have higher board and CEO ownership levels 
(Wright et al., 2009). An additional benefit of the equity share model is that it locks the key 
managers into the company for the whole holding period. On the downside however, as with 
high leverage, increasing managerial ownership can result in a decreased financial 
performance due to managerial risk aversion (Loos, 2005). 
In addition to increasing equity ownership among the top management, private equity firms 
increase pay-to-performance structures for a larger number of employees to step up 
motivation (Jensen, 1989). These schemes are not necessarily only restricted to upper and 
middle management, but may be extended even deeper into the organization. Wright and 
Robbie (1996) provide empirical evidence that incentives do help to reduce managerial 
opportunism; in their study the use of incentives was shown to be negatively correlated with 
MBO failures. 
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Improving Monitoring and Controlling 
In the governance structure generally used in the LBO setting, the private equity firm 
essentially acts as an intermediary between shareholders (the investors in the fund) and 
management teams of the individual portfolio companies. According to Loos (2006), from a 
corporate governance point of view, the General Partners “must be seen as a hybrid between 
managers (or ‘agents’) and owners (or ‘principals’).” With respect to the managers of the 
LBO fund’s portfolio companies, the private equity firm partners or associates act as both 
additional professional managers by adjusting strategic and operational objectives as well as 
legal representatives of the shareholders. They are in a position to closely monitor the 
management of the portfolio company, supported by the carefully tailored financial structure 
for their controlling. (Loos, 2005) 
The involvement in the monitoring of management as members of the board offers the 
private equity firm’s partners the chance to get direct access to confidential company 
information. This makes it easier to monitor the ongoing operations as well as to evaluate 
longer-term strategies, and their implementation (Anders, 1992; Cotter & Peck, 2001). This 
monitoring and control function of the LBO firm has been seen as one of the principal 
capabilities of the LBO organization (Baker and Montgomery 1994). One particularly 
important aspect of control over the portfolio company is the owner’s right to determine the 
composition of the top management team.  
It has been suggested that efficient corporate governance mechanisms create a substitute for 
high debt. Portfolio companies, where the private equity firm controls a majority of the post-
LBO equity, tend to have less debt and are less likely to experience financial distress. 
Buyout specialists that closely monitor managers through stronger representation on the 
board also on average use less debt in their LBOs. Active monitoring by the general partners 
substitutes for tighter debt terms in monitoring and motivating managers of LBOs. (Cotter & 
Peck, 2001)  
Mentoring 
With their extensive background and expertize in areas such as finance, acquisitions, 
consulting and certain industries, and being intimately involved in their portfolio companies’ 
operations, private equity professionals also bring in substantial knowledge into the 
businesses. Also a part of this “parenting advantage”, is that private equity firms open up 
their wide professional networks for the use of the management team, frequently also 
recruiting outside advisors with industry expertise into the company (Loos, 2005). Thus, 
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private equity firms can support the value creation in their portfolio companies in various 
ways. 
Restoring entrepreneurial spirit 
An important driver to increased growth and efficiency is often related to the revived 
entrepreneurial spirit, commonly lacking in companies acquired in buyouts. The company 
may have been e.g. a peripheral, non-core business unit of a bigger conglomerate, which is 
then relieved from the constraints of the corporate headquarters, and given more freedom in 
terms of decision rights as well as investment opportunities (Jensen, 1989; Kester & 
Luehrman, 1995; Loos, 2005; Singh, 1990). The renewed corporate governance structure has 
elements resembling that of a startup firm, where top managers enjoy high levels of equity 
(Loos, 2005). What is more, the intimate relationship between the private equity firm’s 
partners and the management team also often improves and simplifies communication. 
Knowing that the partners are just a phone call away, willing to discuss important decisions, 
makes it possible for the management to reach decisions more quickly, and often also more 
freely and independently (Kester & Luehrman, 1995). The energized and motivated 
management team, taking ownership of the challenges and development plans of the 
company, are also more willing to take difficult decisions regarding e.g. divestments, layoffs 
and strategic redirections to make the buyout a success. 
Private equity firms encourage their portfolio companies to drastically change the way they 
conduct business, if a strategic innovation has a high likelihood of success (Wright et al., 
2001). Studies have shown increases in new product development, technological alliances, 
R&D and new business creation activities taking place after buyouts (Loos, 2005). Wright 
and Robbie (1996) show that this kind of increased corporate entrepreneurship is also 
positively associated with improvements in company performance. 
Advising and enabling 
An important aspect of the parenting advantage of belonging to the family of a particular 
private equity firm is the knowledge the general partners bring to the company through 
constant constructive interaction, mostly informal and non-bureaucratic by nature. While 
mostly staying away from operational, day-to-day issues, the private equity team takes an 
active role in strategy development, challenging the management team’s vision and views 
and bringing in new perspectives. They are, on average, much closer to the managers, 
especially the CEO, than the conglomerate headquarters or the board of directors in 
traditional organizations.  
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When embarking on an aggressive growth path, private equity firms also bring in the needed 
financing that enables, e.g., add-on acquisitions. With substantial knowledge and experience 
on deal making and acquisition processes as a whole, they help the management team to plan 
and execute the buy-and-build strategy in a way that would not have been possible without 
them (Loos, 2005).  
Private equity firms, in having seen a wide array of different companies, also accumulate a 
deep understanding of effective ways of working, e.g. in the context of the board of directors 
and its interplay with the management team. The partners are also in a good position to 
advise the CEO on matters such as teamwork between the managers, especially if a 
management audit was made during the due diligence process. And ultimately, if it seems 
that the some management team members are not pulling their weight, private equity firms 
are on average more trigger happy in finding replacements.  
One significant value adding benefit comes from the private equity firm’s network of 
contacts in various industries, especially in the financial and consulting circles, which are 
often exploited to the benefit of the portfolio company. In the words of Berg and Gottschalg 
(2005), “Be it to find a business partner, to search for and to recruit a new manager for the 
portfolio company (headhunting services) or to identify potential targets for the buy-and-
build strategy, contacts of the buyout firm may be an important success factor for the 
portfolio company.” (Berg & Gottschalg, 2005) 
2.2.5. Summary of Value Generation Methods in LBOs 
Table 1 summarizes the value generation methods discussed above. The table is adapted 
from Berg & Gottschalg (2005), with additions (marked with *) made based findings from 








Table 1: Levers of value generation in LBOs (adapted from Berg & Gottschalg (2005), additions 











Financial arbitrage       
...based on changes in market 
valuation x  x x   
...based on private 
information about the 
company 
x  x x   
...through superior market 
information x  x x   
...through superior deal 
making capabilities x  x x   
Financial engineering       
Optimizing the capital 
structure x x   x  
Reducing corporate tax x x   x  
Negotiating better loan terms* x x   x  
Increasing operational 
efficiency       
Cost cutting & margin 
improvements (x) x   x  
Reducing capital requirements (x) x   x  
Removing managerial 
inefficiencies (x) x   x  
Increasing strategic 
distinctiveness       
Refocusing corporate strategy (x) x   x  
Reducing complexity of 
organization* (x) x   x  
Organic and inorganic 
growth*  x   x  
Reduction of agency cost       
Reducing agency cost of FCF x (x)    x 
Improving incentive 
alignment x x    x 
Improving monitoring and 
controlling  x    x 
Mentoring       
Restoring entrepreneurial 
spirit x x    x 
Advising and enabling x x    x 
Utilizing wide professional 
networks* x x    x 
 
In accordance with the scope of this research, the levers of value capturing (i.e. financial 
arbitrage) are left largely out of focus in this study. Effective planning and management of 
the post-deal honeymoon period aims at value creation, through both primary and secondary 
levers, and thus the focus here is on the acquisition and holding phases, not on the 
divestment process.   
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2.3. Synthesis of the Literature Review 
2.3.1. Private Equity and Value Creation in LBOs 
Private equity, as defined by Sharp (2001), is “The provision of equity capital to companies 
whose shares are not listed on a recognized stock exchange”. A leveraged buyout, then again, 
is defined by Loos (2006) as “A transaction in which a group of private investors, typically 
including management, purchases a significant and controlling equity stake in a public or 
non-public corporation or a corporate division, using significant debt financing, which it 
raises by borrowing against the assets and/or cash flows of the target firm”. 
PE companies are only temporary owners of companies, seeking to divest their investments 
usually in three to five years. This limited ownership period has a significant impact on the 
dynamics of the situation. It i.a. heightens the importance of the start of the holding period 
and of charting possible exit avenues already at time of the deal-making period. Furthermore, 
it also makes it easier to get key managers to commit financially to the company, leading to 
better incentive alignment between all key parties. (Rogers et al., 2002; Jensen, 1989; Sarah 
Kaplan, 1989; Baker and Montgomery, 1994; Heel and Kehoe, 2005) 
PE firms seek to induce an appreciation of the equity value of the business during their 
holding period. Berg and Gottschalg (2005) categorize the ways of value generation into 
levers of value capturing, and levers of value creation. Value capturing is based mainly on 
financial arbitrage through changes in market valuation, private information about the target 
company, superior market information or superior deal making capabilities. Value creation 
levers then again include financial engineering, increasing operational efficiency, increasing 
strategic distinctiveness, reduction of agency cost, and mentoring the managers. Studies (e.g. 
Kaplan 1989; Loos, 2006; Ernst&Young, 2012; Achleitner et al., 2010; Heel & Kehoe, 2005; 
Klie et al., 2009) have shown that the superior returns of buyout funds are increasingly the 
result of PE firms taking an active role in their portfolio companies during the holding period. 
Furthermore, these studies indicate that the core of value creation has increasingly shifted 
from financial and governance engineering towards value created by operational and 
strategic improvements. 
2.3.1. The Planning and Management of the Post-deal Period 
The increasing importance of operational and strategic improvements as value drivers in 
LBOs highlight the general significance of active management and mentoring on behalf of 
the private equity company. Also, keeping the limited investment horizon in mind, ensuring 
a smooth yet rapid transition and “learning to work together” phase creates a foundation for 
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success in light of the whole holding period. Furthermore, the sooner a company can 
implement the planned value creating changes, the bigger the upside effect on returns on 
investment. 
Because of this common knowledge of the importance of a good start to the post-deal 
holding period, the concept of “100-day programs” has spread from the world of mergers 
and acquisitions also into private equity. For example all of the handful of private equity 
professionals interviewed by Schwetzler (2007) confirmed that 100-day plans and programs 
are commonly used in LBOs today, and that they are likely to gain further importance in the 
future. However, the interviewees did stress, that like LBO investments in general, 100-day 
programs can hardly be fully standardized, but the measures applied depend on the situation 
and characteristics of the individual investment. 
Heel and Kehoe (2005) also report that distinctive to the best-performing LBOs is that the 
private equity firm’s partners simply devote more hours during the initial stages of the deal. 
They spend more than half of their time on the newly acquired company during the first 100 
days, meeting almost daily with the top executives. The time spent with the key players is 
essential for reaching a consensus on the company’s strategic priorities. Also, this is when 
relationships are built and personal responsibilities detailed. In contrast to the success stories, 
lower-performing deals typically took up only 20% of the partners’ time during this crucial 
period. What, according to the authors, also distinguishes the best performers is that they 
seek out expertise during the deal-making process before committing themselves to the 
company, craft better value creation plans and execute them more effectively, and implement 
performance management systems with an appropriate set of key performance indicators. 
(Heel & Kehoe, 2005)  
As the private equity literature is yet to develop frameworks for planning and managing the 
start of the holding period, Table 2 dissects the value generation drivers introduced in the 
previous chapters into measures likely to be taken during any LBO honeymoon period. This 
is nothing but an initial listing used as a thematic foundation for the empirical research, 
which will then broaden our understanding of the subject. Also, the focus here is on the areas 
that drive value creation after the deal is closed, thus leaving the value capturing levers, i.e. 









A PE firm is to… 
POST-DEAL PHASE: 
A PE firm is to… 
Financial 
engineering 
 Determine the optimal capital structure 
for the company 
 Lead loan negotiations with financial 
institutions 
 Be cautious of excess leverage creating 
financial distress, managerial risk-
aversion and short-term orientation 
 Lead relationships with financial 
institutions 





 Plan cost cutting and CAPEX reducing 
measures (due diligence provides 
additional input) 
 Assess the management team’s 
competencies (management audit), and 
make changes as soon as possible  
 Create a 100-day plan 
 Form detailed plans and execute cost 
cutting and CAPEX reducing 
measures in cooperation with 
management 
 Continuously assess the management 
team’s competencies, and make 
replacements or additions when 
needed 





 Accumulate deep market, industry, 
competitor and company-specific 
knowledge to be able to form individual 
opinions on strategic questions (due 
diligence)  
 Define an investment thesis with 3-5 
key value creation themes and outline 
potential exit routes 
 Develop an initial shared vision and 
strategic direction with the management 
team 
 Plan an organizational structure that 
supports and is in line with the strategy 
and value creation plan 
 Start executing the value creation 
plan outlined in the investment thesis 
 Develop and implement a detailed 
strategic plan with the management 
team 
 Adjust the organizational structure to 




 Encourage / force top management and 
other key people to invest a significant 
amount of own capital  
 Extend ownership to lower levels of the 
organization 
 Design comprehensive incentive 
systems, emphasizing pay-to-
performance structures  
 Ensure all necessary information flows 
to the general partners and the board  
 Determine the structure and 
appointments of the board of directors 
and the management team 
 Clarify, on a broad level, the reporting 
practices and key performance 
indicators 
 Build trust and personal relationships to 
ensure efficient cooperation with the 
management team 
 Create ambitious business plans and 
strategic and operational goals for 
managers 
 Ensure all necessary information 
flows to the general partners and the 
board of directors 
 Agree on reporting practices and key 
performance indicators, and make 
sure every party adheres to them 
 Build trust and personal relationships 
to ensure efficient cooperation with 
the management team 
Mentoring 
 Accumulate knowledge on the 
management team’s ways of working 
and the strengths and weaknesses of its 
 Make sure that the management team, 
despite the newly designed control 
mechanisms, has the necessary 
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individual members (possible 
management audit) 
freedom to reach decisions quickly 
and work independently  
 Accumulate knowledge on the 
management team’s ways of working 
and the strengths and weaknesses of 
its individual members   
 Act as a mentor and enabler on areas 
where it has considerable expertize 
(e.g., financing and add-on 
acquisitions) 
 Make use of its professional networks 
in assisting the management team  
 
3. Research Methodology 
3.1. Research approach 
As the literature review showed, very little is known about how private equity investors plan 
and manage the post-deal honeymoon period in their portfolio companies. Thus, the 
empirical research conducted was mainly exploratory by nature, trying to uncover the 
approaches employed by one Finnish PE investor across multiple portfolio firm acquisitions.  
Case study was selected as the research method due to its particular suitability for studying 
the "how" and "why" questions and for creating understanding of contemporary complex 
social phenomena (Yin, 2009; Yin, 2003). As all actions of PE investors are highly context-
dependent, it is important to understand the pre- and post-deal phases in a holistic manner in 
order to be able to draw conclusions, detect patterns and build theory. Interviewing the case 
PE firm's (“Deep Blue”) representatives without the questions being tied to particular cases 
would have resulted in more abstract discussion with less clear answers especially to why 
things were done in a certain way. Studying multiple cases from both Deep Blue’s and the 
portfolio companies' managers' perspectives brings forth the context-dependencies, gives 
strength to the findings, and better enables the evaluation of the methods employed by Deep 
Blue’s partners in planning and managing the post-deal honeymoon period. (Yin, 2009)  
Case descriptions were written on the basis of the interviews and other secondary data. 
These descriptions of what was done, the effects, challenges and successes, formed a basis 
for cross-case comparisons, analyses, and results. 
3.2. Data collection methods 
Before launching into conducting the case-specific interviews, all partners of the PE firm 
were interviewed about the area of research on a general level. The intention was to get more 
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familiar with the subject and to be able to create a loose frame for the interview questions. 
Also the findings from the literature review were utilized when forming the structure and 
questions for the actual case interviews. However, the structure was used mainly as a general 
interview guide (Patton, 2002), that helped to ensure that all participants were interviewed in 
a more systematic way from the start, without limiting the issues to be explored to a certain 
fixed set of questions. The interview instrument, validated with experts from both Deep Blue 
and Aalto University, was also constantly developed further as the case-specific study 
progressed and new themes emerged. 
The primary data was collected in open-ended semi-structured interviews conducted face-to-
face individually with each interviewee. In each of the five cases (summarized in Table 3 of 
chapter 3.3.) the interviewees included two partner-level members of Deep Blue’s deal teams, 
and two or three management team members from the buyout target's side. All partners were 
interviewed first before moving on to interviewing the managers. Including the perspective 
of the management team in the study was critical. People are often blind to their own actions 
and mistakes, so had the study relied only on the PE firm's representatives' accounts, many 
themes requiring development would never have emerged. 
All in all 23 case interviews were conducted, all of which were recorded and transcribed. 
The length of the interviews ranged from 45 minutes to two hours, with the variation 
stemming from differences in factors such as complexity of the case company's situation, 
how well the post-deal period had gone, and the position and personality of the interviewee. 
All interviews were conducted in Finnish. 
Data triangulation was done using secondary data such as investment memorandums, due 
diligence reports, board minutes, internal information presentations, press releases and board 
documents and presentations.  
3.3. Sample selection 
The Case PE Investor  
The case PE investor, "Deep Blue", is a Finnish private equity firm focusing on acquiring 
and actively developing Finnish SME companies. Deep Blue has no specific industry focus, 
but does majority buyout investments in a variety of different industries. Turn-around 
investments are beyond its scope, while the investment strategy emphasizes growth 
opportunities and strong cash flow. 
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Deep Blue employs some 15 professionals with expertise ranging from finance and 
consulting to CEO positions. The acquired portfolio firms are managed by a deal team 
assembled case-specifically from the partners and employees of Deep Blue, sometimes 
reinforced by trusted outside advisors.  
Deep Blue is yet to develop a standardized way of planning and managing the post-deal 
honeymoon period when acquiring a new portfolio company. How things are done thus 
depends a lot on who the deal team members are, how they are accustomed to operating, and 
how well the assembled deal team itself functions as team. Some tools – such as frameworks 
for carrying out or facilitating a strategy formulation process, and templates for corporate 
governance documents and CEO board reporting – have been built to bring unity into the 
ways of working. However, these tools are seldom utilized due to various reasons, such as 
their rigidity or excessive scope and detail, the tools not being up-to-date, everyone not 
agreeing on the principles they stand for, or simply because not everyone knows about the 
existence of these instruments. No tools or frameworks have been created to depict the 
whole process of planning and managing the post-deal honeymoon period on a broader scale.   
The Case Companies 
Because of the broadness and complexity of the studied phenomenon, it was important that 
the number of cases was sufficiently large to bring forth the main context-dependencies, 
while also taking into account the limited time-frame and resources available for conducting 
the study. The five case companies were chosen with the intention of ensuring a required 
level of differences in dimensions such as company size, extent of post-deal changes, 
successfulness of the venture, and the PE firm’s team members involved in the deal team. 









Table 3: Case companies and interviewees 
 Company A Company B Company C Company D Company E 
Relative size 
at time of 
deal 
Small Large+ Large Medium Large 
Merger of 
two or more 
firms at time 
of 
transaction 











A & B 
Partners  
C & D 
Partners  
E & F 
Partners  
D & F  
Partners  
A, C & G 
Interviewed 
managers CEO & CFO 








CFO& CFO at 
time of deal 






















































The interviewees were chosen on the basis of who were the managers who had been most 
involved in the deal-making process, and who had been in closest contact with the PE firm 
during the post-deal honeymoon period.  
To gain an understanding of the differences in ways of working between the PE firm's 
individual deal teams and their members, it was important to study cases with different 
compilations of deal team members. Only this way was it possible to uncover the common 
policies of the firm, but also the aspects that were handled differently by the individual 
partners and teams. 
3.4. Data analyses 
When analyzing the data, the transcribed interview responses and findings from other 
sources were grouped according to themes that had emerged during the study. These themes 
included issues such as relationship building, board work, strategy formation process, 
development of reporting practices, financing issues and agreeing on ways of working and 
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practicalities. This grouping of the data, in addition to being an important result of the study 
per se, was then used when writing the individual case descriptions.  
Both within- and cross-case analyses were conducted. The process of writing detailed case 
write-ups allows for the emergence of unique patterns of each case before generalizing these 
patterns across cases. It also ensures the researcher's familiarity with each case, which in turn 
forms the basis for performing the cross-case analyses (Eisenhardt, 1989). The main reasons 
for conducting cross-case analyses are to increase generalizability, deepen the understanding 
of the context-dependencies, and increase the explanatory power of the conclusions made 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994).  
3.5. Reliability and validity of the research method 
When considering the generalizability of these results, it is important to keep in mind that 
this was a study of one single PE firm concentrating solely on the Finnish SME buyout 
market without any specific industry focus. The question of how factors such as increasing 
buyout target size, possible industry focus and differences in the PE firm's modes of 
operation would impact the findings is largely left for future studies to explore.  
There is also great ambiguity related to the concept "post-deal honeymoon period" itself. 
Where does this honeymoon period end? What are the main features that distinguish it from 
the phase beginning after it?  The answers to these questions are not clear-cut despite the fact 
that all of Deep Blue’s partners and also the management interviewees acknowledged that 
the phase immediately after the deal carries a particular meaning and significance. Most of 
the interviewed Deep Blue’s partners were of the opinion that the often mentioned first 100 
days cannot be used as a standard timeframe for the honeymoon period – it can often span 
much longer than that. This ambiguity related to the length of the honeymoon period was not 
considered a hindrance, as the subject and the themes it entailed were approached in a more 
indirect and broader manner in the interviews. The objective was to determine what the 
honeymoon period entails – how long it lasts was considered a secondary issue. 
As the primary data used in this study relied fully on interviews, the data is naturally subject 
to bias resulting from i.a. incorrect memories, or the interviewees not wanting to admit their 
mistakes. To tackle the possible problem of false memories, data triangulation was 
performed with the help of secondary data sources specified above in Table 4. Also, to 
ensure that as many challenges and mistakes as possible were to arise in the interviews, each 
case study contained the perspective four to five interviewees.  
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What was initially a big concern was that the managers might not feel comfortable giving 
feedback on the actions of their superiors (Deep Blue’s deal team members were all 
members of the boards of the case companies). To mitigate this possible challenge, the 
researcher tried to emphasize his status as a student and downplay his direct connection to 
Deep Blue. The interviewees were also promised that certain pieces of feedback were to be 
kept confidential and not conveyed directly to Deep Blue, at least with any names attached to 
them. This concern of managers not wanting to talk about the challenges and development 
needs was, however, largely found unnecessary – most managers talked very openly about 
things they wished had been handled differently.  
4. Case Studies of Five SME Buyouts by a Finnish PE 
Investor 
4.1. Case Descriptions 
Next follows descriptions of the five buyouts examined in this study. The objective here is to 
give a sufficiently detailed account of the characteristics of each case company, the situation 
at the time of the transaction and what was done during the following months, so that the 
reader is able to get a feel for the context-dependencies and development themes present in 
different buyouts. Each case description emphasizes slightly different aspects, and thus do 
not all necessarily discuss the same themes.  
4.1.1. Case Company A 
The pre-deal period 
At the time of the transaction, Company A was formed from what were initially two separate 
firms providing complementary services. The two firms were to create a platform for further 
organic and inorganic growth. Thus, this case exemplifies a typical buy-and-build strategy, 
where a PE investor seeks to induce consolidation and build a strong position in a 
fragmented market by uniting a large number of small companies.  
According to the interviewees, it was clear already before the closing of the deal that day-to-
day work and routines were not going to be impacted much. The then current managers 
would still be the ones in charge of the operative business. What Deep Blue required, 
however, was the formation of a group structure, which also meant creating group-level 
finances and reporting. There was also to be cooperation between the two units in matters 
such as quality and best practices, but there were no clear plans on how the cooperation was 
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to be organized. The vision of where the company was to be at the time of exit was also 
discussed with the managers, but was mainly the creation of Deep Blue's deal team. No 
explicit 100-day plan or equivalent road map for the honeymoon period was made.  
The post-deal period 
How the post-deal period was begun in Company A was somewhat atypical in comparison to 
the other case companies. As both Deep Blue's deal team and the management teams of the 
two units acknowledged the sensitivity of the situation due to a number of factors (reasons 
not disclosed here), the announcement event was held as late as two weeks after the closing 
of the deal. This way it could be shown to the organization that nothing really was to change 
in their day-to-day work. Deep Blue's team didn't attend the briefing events, as it was 
deemed better that their role be downplayed as much as possible. The CEOs of the two units 
were, however, instructed by the deal team on how to conduct the announcement event, and 
what questions were most probably going to arise.  
It was agreed upon already before the deal, that it would be best to preserve the 
entrepreneurial status of the units, with the units being lead by their current CEOs and 
managers. A real group-level management team was to be formed only after further add-on 
acquisitions. The first new person to be recruited was the Group CFO, whose job was to start 
building tighter system integration and better group-level reporting.  
After the first add-on acquisition one of the unit CEOs was made the CEO of the Group. The 
newly formed management team was made up of the CEO, CFO and the unit leaders. As 
most of the management team members were unfamiliar with leading a group, special 
attention was put on their work practices. An external consultant was brought in to speed up 
the process. 
The board of directors was formed quickly after the deal, with two members coming from 
Deep Blue's deal team, one external member found via Deep Blue's network and one via the 
network of the managers. As the Group didn't have a real management team from day one, 
the role of the board was for some time unusually big and operative by nature.  
A simple two-page Rules of Procedure document was created and approved at the third 
board meeting. It stated that board meetings were to be held once a month, specified when 
board material are to be delivered to the members, and that a standard form was to be created 
for the CEO's reports. It also stated what decisions the CEO is to bring to the board, and 
specified the basic meeting agenda outline and how the meeting minutes are to be dealt with.  
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The management team is invited to board meetings 2-3 times a year, which ensures that the 
relationships and transparency are maintained at an adequate level. Although outside of these 
meetings the deal team is in direct contact mainly with the Group CEO and CFO, the 
relationships between the parties seem to be the most open out of all the case companies. E.g. 
the communication between the board and management team is not channeled so heavily 
through the CEO-Chairman link as in other companies studied here.  
At first, the Group strategy rested mainly on the vision and buy-and-build strategy created by 
Deep Blue. Only after the first three add-on acquisitions were completed, did the board and 
management team have official strategy meetings. As one of Deep Blue's deal team members 
put it, "The truly shared vision was created unusually late in this company, almost a year 
after the transaction. Also, 'process' may be a bit too big of a word to describe the strategy 
work done then." A small market research was commissioned, Deep Blue did background 
work and analyses, and a shared outlook on the direction and target level were formed. This 
was done using frameworks that many of Deep Blue's team members were familiar with. 
The reporting practices and key measurements were not completely clear at the time of the 
transaction. In addition to building i.a. the standard income statements and balance sheet on 
a group level, finding the right measures that enable inter-unit comparisons was considered 
important. One deal team member compiled a rudimentary form for what was to be reported 
to the board, which was then developed further in cooperation with the CEOs of the units. 
One of the early projects was to bring the financial administration of the companies under a 
shared system. The Group's finances and investor relationships have been primarily in Deep 
Blue's hands from day one.  
It was clear from the very beginning, that Deep Blue would play an especially big role in 
screening the market for acquisition targets and leading the deal-making processes. The role 
was particularly emphasized in the first two add-on acquisitions, as no group-level 
management team was in place, and the managers of the two units had no prior experience in 
the acquisitions. Also, as the first add-on unit quickly turned out to be a much more 
challenging endeavor than expected, Deep Blue's deal team took a substantial role in the 
project group that finally managed to tackle the problems. Because the add-on companies 
were to stay essentially as standalone units, the integration efforts were mainly centered on 
integrating the financial administration – a task of the CFO.  
4.1.2. Case Company B 
The pre-deal period 
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When the transaction was made, despite operating under the same brand, Company B was 
formed from two almost completely distinct businesses. The two firms did almost no 
cooperation together, and were in many ways very different. One was twice as large as the 
other one, and highly profitable, whereas the smaller firm was struggling to keep itself above 
the surface. What the two firms had in common were some customers, ownership, and the 
fact that both provided professional services to large Finnish and international corporate 
customers.  
After a long negotiation phase, with an in-depth due diligence process including a 
commercial DD, it was decided that the two companies would be bought with an initial plan 
of executing a semi-strong integration. How deep the integration would eventually be, was to 
be determined in an extensive strategy process that would begin quickly after the deal. 
According to one of Deep Blue's deal team members, "Before the deal we had some kind of 
a view of where to take the company, but many things were still unresolved, because of the 
pending integration issues." No 100-day or equivalent plans were made.  
The post-deal period 
Due the relatively large size of the Company with mostly expert-status personnel, 
considerable emphasis was put on the announcement occasion. E.g. the presentation slides 
were planned in cooperation of Deep Blue, both firms' CEOs, the other firm's 
communications manager and the former main owner. The information event was sent as a 
live video broadcast to all offices around the world. A separate event had already been held 
for the management teams of the two companies prior to the general announcements to 
ensure they were up-to-date and on board. Key customers had also been informed already 
well beforehand. Press releases were sent about 15 minutes after the beginning of the general 
announcement event to ensure the appropriate order of information flows.  
After the first announcement event, the CEOs of the two firms and the Chairman of the 
board (Deep Blue's deal team member) commenced a "Road Show", during which they held 
an information event in altogether eight locations in various countries. As in the general 
announcement occasion the message focused on the positive aspects of the deal. According 
to all interviewees the ownership change was well perceived, and personnel reactions were 
mainly positive.  
The new group-level management team was formed from the two previously separate teams. 
After commissioning a management audit from an external consultant, it was decided that 
the CEO position would be assigned to the CEO of the larger firm, who would then assemble 
his own management team. The situation was of course not fully without hardships, as it is 
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always difficult to find suitable positions for the managers left without a management team 
post. And thus, after some months, the former CEO of the smaller firm left the Company. 
The composition of the board was decided at the end of the deal making process, when the 
deal was struck. The board ended up having six members, with Deep Blue taking over the 
post of the Chairman. Deep Blue implemented some quite considerable changes to the 
board’s working methods. Previously the boards of the two companies had met four times a 
year, which was now increased to 10 times, with the board participating more in the decision 
making than before. In the first meeting, the Chairman told about his philosophy of how he 
sees the board operating. However, no explicit Rules of Procedure or other documents 
describing the board’s working practices were created.  
The strategy process, envisioned already before the deal, was commenced quickly, with key 
priorities being to figure out to what degree the two companies should be integrated, and 
what customer segments the Group should focus on. Furthermore, it was also important to 
bring the management teams of the two firms together to get to know each other, and learn to 
work together. The process was planned cooperatively by Deep Blue, the CEOs of the two 
firms, and the consultancy firm chosen to facilitate the process. Altogether 20 key people 
from both organizations were involved in the strategy work. Deep Blue's deal team members' 
participation was quite limited: "We mostly listened, not taking too active a role", the 
Chairman explained. They mainly created a frame for the process by defining the long-term 
objectives, growth targets and integration goals.  
The process started out with an initial idea of a partial integration – only the supporting 
functions were to be completely merged. However, once the strategy work started, the 
management teams quickly opted for a complete group-wide integration, executed as soon as 
possible. Deep Blue fully welcomed this view. According to the Chairman they had been for 
a strong integration from the beginning, but had been cautious of demanding it too forcefully 
– “We thought it best if the management team came to see the benefits and superiority of full 
integration on their own.” 
According to the company CFO the Deep Blue has brought tougher demands on the finance 
department. E.g. the cycle time of reporting has shortened, closer attention is paid to 
forecasts and the accuracy of all data. The most essential additions to what was already being 
measured and reported were cash flow statements and forecasts, as well as loan covenants, 
which meant that the company had to also start forecasting its balance sheet. Because the 
two firms had different data systems, it ended up being a major project to build a combined 
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reporting system. According to Deep Blue, the reporting standards are in some parts still not 
quite met.  
Financing matters and responsibilities were dealt with at the time of the deal, after which all 
information to the financiers has gone via Deep Blue – the company of course still produces 
the numbers for the reports.  
4.1.3. Case Company C 
The pre-deal period 
Company C is a Finland-based consumer business with a leading position in its market. The 
Group, formed at the time of the deal, consists of four previously relatively interrelated firms 
now truly brought under the same organization.  
A specialty about this case was that it was already clear at the time of the deal, that the then 
acting CEO would leave his post as CEO and join the board during the first year. What is 
also notable is that this is a much more traditional LBO case than the other cases in this 
study. The post-deal plans didn't include great changes; the projected value increases were to 
come mainly from steady cash flow, moderate growth of both revenues and the valuation 
multiple, and most of all from the change in the financial structure.  
No detailed 100-day plans were put on paper – "We basically bought the management team's 
ideas on where to take the firm, and because no great changes in direction were foreseeable, 
we didn't see a great need for a 100-day program", one deal team member explained. 
The post-deal period 
According to the Chairman of the board, the post-deal communication strategy was planned 
with great detail. The company was used to working with a communications agency, so the 
agency was also closely involved in the planning and practical execution.  
The announcement event was held at the Company's head offices and sent as a live video 
stream to all other locations. The key message was "business as usual" – no great changes 
were going to take place because of the ownership change. To tackle the possibly dubious 
picture of private equity investors in the minds of the personnel, the message was crafted to 
be as positive as possible. Deep Blue would be there to support the organization and the 
growth plans with its capital and know-how. Deep Blue was referred to mainly as the "main 
owner", not a private equity investor. No Road Show was done here, but the deal team did 
attend major company and personnel events soon after the deal.  
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The composition of the board was decided on at the end of the deal making process. Deep 
Blue once again took over the post of the Chairman. In addition to their two board members, 
other members included the previous main owner, and later the former CEO. According to 
the Chairman Deep Blue didn't want to start making radical changes to how the board 
worked, its relationship to the management or to the CEO's reporting practices right from the 
start. It was thought that these changes would come much more naturally once the new CEO 
took over.  
The board and the management team did a mostly recreational 3-day trip together about four 
months after the transaction. Company strategy was also lightly on the agenda, but was 
discussed mainly in an unofficial manner. The board also later did a trip of their own. These 
happenings were thought of as team building activities, and were assessed to have been 
worthwhile in building crucial relationships. 
As the plan was to proceed in a "business as usual" mode, no real strategy work was done 
during the first months. "At the time of the deal we had our hypotheses concerning e.g. 
growth paths, and in the beginning we were mainly testing the validity of these assumptions. 
We had no need for a strategy process", the Chairman summed up. 
Despite the overall starting level being quite high in the company, the development of 
reporting practices is still work in progress. One member of the deal team has worked in 
particularly close contact with the company CFO to refine the measurements and board-level 
reports. According to him, the change of CEO also made it easier to call for changes to the 
board-level reporting practices – "With an experienced CEO like the company's earlier CEO, 
you can't go announcing that this reporting format is no good, we need to make serious 
changes to it. Especially not when he's stepping down from the post in the coming months."  
According to the new CEO, Deep Blue has put more emphasis on financial numbers, 
forecasting and scenario building, which has helped the company look ahead in a more 
structured way. The previous CEO also contemplated that earlier they didn't need to report to 
anyone, as everyone sitting in the board had such a deep understanding of the business. "But 
now that the focus has shifted into building the company towards a successful exit, the 
numbers have become more important. When the next buyer conducts a due diligence and 
goes through all the reports and numbers, it should form a coherent story of how the 
company has been managed, and where the numbers stem from – a story where a board 
meeting ends one chapter of the book." 
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4.1.4. Case Company D 
The pre-deal period 
Company D is a Finnish B2B service company with a leading position in its market. The 
Company was bought through an auction process, which meant that the case had a somewhat 
different starting point for Deep Blue than the other cases covered in this sample. An auction 
process, like explained in the theoretical part of this thesis, limits the exchange that the buyer 
can have with the seller and the management team of the company being sold. As one Deep 
Blue's deal team member in this case stated, "An auction is usually not the most ideal basis, 
because you get to meet the management team with exclusivity only at the very end of the 
process. This of course raises the risk-level for us. However, what is good about an auction 
is that the advisors have prepared ample material on the company, its environment, and 
future prospects, and that the deal-making process doesn't drag on forever, but has a distinct 
deadline."  
What also increased the risk associated in the venture was that there was great uncertainty 
related to who was going to occupy, what were from Deep Blue’s perspective, the two most 
important management positions. The CEO of the Company had been hired only on a fixed-
term contract, and the Company’s real CFO was on a leave of absence, and wasn't to return 
until 3 months after the deal. Deep Blue was able to persuade the acting CEO to continue his 
assignment, but the CFO remained a question mark – a risk that was deemed acceptable as 
the business was on a steady basis.  
Because the auction process put restrictions on the amount of interaction between Deep Blue 
and the management team, it wasn't possible to create a truly shared vision and post-deal 
plan cooperatively. The management team presented the business plans they had prepared, 
and Deep Blue evaluated their plausibility and whether the plans had the required growth 
elements. No 100-day plan was created. 
The post-deal period 
According to the Chairman they put great effort into the launch, communications, and 
making the management team committed to the company and the plans. "We gave a face to 
the owners, and showed that we are very committed to the company ourselves. We had an 
information event at the head office, and it was broadcasted live to other locations. The CEO 
gave a short summary of the ownership change, and explained that he would continue as 
CEO and co-owner of the Company. After that, as the Chairman, I introduced Deep Blue, 
told about our expectations and objectives on a vision-level, and tried to create a positive 
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atmosphere by emphasizing what a great organization the Company is, and how Deep Blue 
will help it become even greater. Then the CEO explained the future plans in more detail. 
And finally people had a chance to ask questions." The message was that no immediate 
radical changes were to be expected, and that the organization could go on working just like 
before. A week after the first announcement event, the CEO and the Chairman initiated a 
Road Show to hold similar information events in all the other offices around Finland. 
The board was kept compact with only three members, two from Deep Blue's deal team and 
one outside member found through Deep Blue's network. In it's first meeting, the board 
reviewed its Year Clock, i.e. what themes were to be dealt with in more detail and when. It 
went through its Rules of Procedure, amended and approved the Company's existing 
Corporate Governance Manual, clarified the reporting practices, and discussed the role of the 
board and its relationship with the management team. Already before the first meeting the 
deal team had put effort into making sure the board material was on an acceptable level.  
According to the CEO the board has maintained its focus on the "what", and left the "how" 
up to the management team – "The roles are very clear." The current CFO contemplated that 
before Deep Blue's era, the previous board had been very distant, maintaining contact 
basically only with the CEO and CFO. "When I came back the whole management team had 
been planning the company's strategy together with the board. Also, the custom now is that 
in every board meeting there's one top manager reporting on his/her area. […] There's a clear 
difference – now the managers know all of the board members by name." The board clearly 
strives to communicate its interest in the company – like the Chairman said, "To do this we 
e.g. try to have our meetings in the Company's premises rather than at Deep Blue's office." 
After the deal Deep Blue quickly commissioned a management audit, which clearly 
indicated that the management team was not necessarily working as a team in an optimal 
fashion. It was decided that the consultant also keep working with the team to improve their 
teamwork. Additionally, one manager was replaced soon after the deal. 
As said, the management team had already prepared quite well thought out business plans at 
the time of the deal, so there was no need for very extensive strategy workouts. Deep Blue 
did, however, kick off a small-scale strategy process to ensure it was crystal-clear to all 
parties. According to the Chairman, Deep Blue didn't have a big role in either planning or 
executing the process: "We let the management team do it in their own way with the tools 
they were accustomed to. The Company already had a lot of strategy material, even a bit too 
much. We tried to bring a better focus into it by giving some guidelines and instructions."  
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The acting CFO at the time contemplated that it is extremely important to have the board 
engage the management team in strategy work – "How else is it possible to make the 
managers feel like they and the board are rowing in the same direction, if they don't even feel 
like they are being listened to?" However, one deal team member reminded, "It is difficult 
for a private equity firm to contribute much to the strategy work when it is initiated quickly 
after the deal, because we don't necessarily know the business that well then. It's good to 
clarify the strategy to the new board and owners, but often it is better to give it some time 
before launching into an extensive strategy process." 
One of Deep Blue's deal team members had a planning meeting with the CFO quickly after 
the transaction to communicate Deep Blue's requirements concerning reporting practices. 
"We carefully went through the numbers with the CFO, and talked about the board-level 
reporting requirements, so that we'd get satisfactory reports right from the start. I've never 
had a case company where there wasn't any work to be done in that area", the deal team 
member contemplated, despite acknowledging that the company’s reporting practices were 
on a high level already at the time of the transaction. 
4.1.5. Case Company E 
The pre-deal period 
Company E is a Finland-based company in the B2B market, with subsidiaries in various 
countries. The Group consists of three separate businesses operating in the same market.  
The deal-making process was initiated by the owner-managers of the Company with the 
primary intention of finding a private equity firm to support them in realizing their growth 
objectives. The vision and business plans at the time of the deal were mainly the work of the 
management team. What made it especially difficult for Deep Blue to truly challenge the 
management team's views, was that the commissioned commercial due diligence did not 
manage to form a complete picture of the business and the market. As a result of the weak 
CDD and a partially lacking financial due diligence, the deal team had to rely mainly on the 
management's opinions and analyses, which wasn't an optimal starting point from Deep 
Blue's perspective.  
At the time of the transaction, the management team owned the Company. From a 
governance perspective this was a somewhat interesting situation as the shareholder's 
meeting, board of directors and management team consisted essentially of the same people. 
This meant that the managers were used to making even shareholder's meeting-level 
decisions quite flexibly. Now that Deep Blue was to become the main owner, this situation 
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was of course to change. According to the interviewees, there was some discussion about the 
necessary operating policy changes already during the deal-making process, but these 
remained mainly on a general level. No detailed account on e.g. Deep Blue's corporate 
governance policies was given to the managers. Neither was a 100-day plan created.   
The post-deal period 
On Day 1, the Chairman of the board and the CEO held information events in the Company's 
two main locations in Finland. The managers who were not included in the deal-making 
process were informed earlier about the deal. Here too the CEO and Chairman quickly 
commenced a Road Show, a series of information events in the Company's major locations 
abroad. The key message was that the Company would accelerate its growth track under 
Deep Blue's ownership, and that the key managers would maintain their positions and a 
share of the Company.  
It was decided at the end of the negotiation process that all three partners of Deep Blue’s 
deal team would become board members. Other members included the CEO, and one outside 
member (the chairman of the former board). Later also the COO of the company was granted 
a position in the board. The CFO also being present in the board meetings as the secretary 
lead to a situation where basically the board and the management team were again very 
much intertwined. 
In its first meetings the board discussed its ways of working on a general level, but didn't 
create and agree on any documents related to e.g. rules of procedure or corporate governance 
issues. Some important themes to be discussed more extensively were scheduled for 
upcoming meetings, but no formal Year Clock was or has been created.  
As said, with the somewhat failed due diligence process as the foundation, the starting point 
for the holding period wasn't fully optimal. Because the Company had a rather extensive 
integration process ahead of it (Deep Blue called for more synergies especially between the 
two biggest firms), a formal strategy process was considered the best way to form a strategic 
plan, decide on the integration issues, build momentum for change and generally get things 
rolling. The process started only a few weeks after the closing of the deal, with a relatively 
large number of people from all three organizations taking part in the work. A consultant 
was brought to facilitate the process. 
A secondary objective of the strategy process was to get the managers of the different 
organizations to get to know each other and learn to work together. What comes to Deep 
Blue's role in the strategy process, other than taking part in planning of the process and being 
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present in the kick-off event, the deal team's participation in the strategy work was quite 
minor.  
According to one deal team member it soon became evident that the consultant facilitating 
the process didn't’ quite know what he was doing. "The fellow had earlier done sales 
consulting gigs for the Company, and the CEO recommended him quite emphatically. But he 
clearly didn't know how to structure a strategy process, despite our efforts to instruct him. 
The process was a big failure, and lead to a lot of confusion. That was almost two months 
down the drain. At the end the board decided to take what the process had created and 
finalize the strategy with only the core people present. But the thing is that our deal team 
should have taken a more decisive role in the post-deal developments, and in hiring the 
consultant."  
When inquired about the development of reporting practices, the CFO recounts that during 
the deal-making period the message to her had been that the Company's reporting practices 
were quite sufficient from Deep Blue's perspective. "But after the deal our reporting 
suddenly needed a lot of work. Not a single board meeting has gone by without amendments 
to the requirements – we still don't have the final format figured out." What of course made 
the development of reporting practices a bigger project was the required integration of 
especially the two biggest firms that still had separate systems in place.  
4.2. Results of the Case Analyses 
The way the post-deal honeymoon period is planned and managed can vary a lot depending 
on the target company and the general situation. However, the empirical case studies suggest 
that the same fundamental elements are present across the different buyouts made by Deep 
Blue (inter-case comparisons of the cases can be found in Appendices 1 and 2). This chapter 
develops a view of the distinctive and focal themes that the data brings forth, and discusses 
the challenges and crucial points related to them in light of the case studies.  
4.2.1. Focal themes in the planning and management of the post-deal 
honeymoon period 




Table 4: Focal themes in the planning and management of the post-deal honeymoon period 
Pre-deal 
themes 
Acquiring sufficient knowledge about the company and its business 
Building trust and relationships with the management team 
Building a shared vision and business plan with the management team 
Discussing ways of working, roles, change requirements and practicalities 
Planning the internal and external communications 
Selecting the board members 
Post-deal 
themes 
Announcing the deal and communicating changes 
Agreeing on ways of working, roles and responsibilities 
Building relationships with the key managers 
Developing the management team and its ways of working 
Beginning board work 
Developing the reporting practices 
Crystallizing and refining the company’s strategy (strategy process) 
Making organizational changes 
Building momentum for change 
Supporting the management team with know-how and resources 




Acquiring sufficient knowledge about the company and its business 
It goes without saying that the foundation for good investment decisions is built on in-depth 
knowledge of the company, the management, its business, and the environment it operates in. 
To be able to accurate valuate the company, estimate the growth potential and risks, create 
an optimal financial structure, form a clear vision and business plan, and communicate 
change requirements to the managers, Deep Blue uses a multitude of sources and methods to 
acquire the necessary information. These include i.a. financial statements, discussions with 
the company managers and previous owners, talks with industry experts, and due diligences.  
Deep Blue taking an active role in the company during the holding period, the broader and 
deeper its understanding of the company, the better it can contribute to the firm’s business. 
E.g. the Chairman of case Company A stated that despite the small size of the company, 
commissioning a commercial due diligence would have helped them to get a faster start: “A 
CDD would have created a better understanding on what kinds of add-on acquisition targets 
we should’ve concentrated our efforts on, and what the customers’ needs were.”  
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What all of the interviewed deal team members highlighted especially was the importance of 
forming an understanding of the company’s leadership culture and the capabilities of 
individual managers. E.g. one deal team member in case Company E explained, “We 
probably didn’t realize how big a change it would be for the management team who was 
used to making board-level decisions when meeting in the hallway. We should pay more 
attention to the leadership culture in the firm and the change needed – the management audit 
commissioned partly before and partly after the deal didn’t analyze the leadership processes, 
but focused solely on analyzing the people.” As posited by the Company B CEO, even a 
separate “culture due diligence” may be beneficial, especially in cases where two companies 
are merged at time of the deal.  
Building trust and relationships with the management team 
All the interviewed Deep Blue’s partners stressed that every single deal boils down to the 
people. “Because we operate mainly through the board, and thus rely fully on the CEO and 
management team to actually run the business, it’s important that all parties trust each other”, 
one partner explained.  
As the foundation for trust between Deep Blue and the managers is built already during the 
deal-making process, Deep Blue tries to meet with the whole management team before the 
transaction, be it simply a common dinner event like in Company C. The inclusion of the 
whole management team is usually done only at the end of the negotiation process. Like 
Company D CEO explains, “The more people are dragged into the rollercoaster that the deal 
making process is, the more the daily work suffers.” 
Building a shared vision and business plan with the management team 
According to all interviewees the clearer the vision of where the company should be at the 
time of Deep Blue’s exit, the better. “When all parties are committed to the same shared 
goals and business plans already before the deal, it creates trust and ensures a smooth launch 
into the holding and development period”, the Chairman of Company C explains. He also 
emphasizes that Deep Blue should always make it crystal-clear to the managers that they are 
only a temporary owner, with the intention of selling the firm to the highest bidder when the 
time comes.   
The way this vision is created varies depending on the situation, but Deep Blue always 
strives to form its own perspective to challenge the management team’s viewpoint. Three to 
five key development themes are elaborated on in the Investment Memorandum created 
before signing the deal.  
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Discussing ways of working, roles, change requirements and practicalities 
A PE firm becoming the majority owner may bring substantial changes to the way a 
company is managed and governed. Many manager interviewees hoped that Deep Blue had 
better explained their way of doing things, their role and especially the change requirements 
already before the deal. E.g. the CEO of Company B recounted that there was talk of Deep 
Blue telling more explicitly about their plans, how things were to be organized and what was 
to change, but this never happened. “Many things remained assumptions. It would be good 
to better inform the management team of the required changes. E.g. the fact that after the 
deal the Company became extremely cash-poor in relation to what we’d been used to was a 
new situation for many people. It would be good to better explain the implications of this – 
we never really discussed what exactly changed here.”  
When asked from the managers, whether a 100-day plan might have brought more clarity 
into the situation at the time of the deal, the virtually unanimous answer was “yes”. Only the 
managers of Companies C and D were of the opinion that such a plan would most likely not 
have made much difference. However, what is noteworthy, is that these were the companies 
where the least changes were needed. Furthermore, even in these firms, the interviewees 
didn’t state that a 100-day plan detailing the concrete steps and schedules, and what things 
were to be agreed upon and when, would have been harmful.  
The manager interviewees at Company E, in calling for more clarity when it comes to 
communicating ways of working and change requirements, suggested that Deep Blue 
develop a “manual” describing their way of doing things. According to the Company CFO, 
“It’s always better to know what’s going to happen, be the things pleasant or not.” The CFO 
of Company B also commented: “It’s not even clear to everyone what a PE investor is. A 
manual explaining what it means when Deep Blue becomes a majority owner would be 
extremely good. I would also put a lot of effort into explaining the practicalities, roles and 
responsibilities, how Deep Blue wants the board to work etc.” 
What the challenges faced at Company E brings forth, is the importance of the deal team’s 
teamwork. As one deal team member put it, “This case is a good example of the things we 
should improve in our own processes. The deal team hasn’t worked as a team, and that has 
lead into many problems that could have been avoided.” Hence, also deal team’s internal 
work practices should be discussed, especially if there are differences in opinions on how the 
post-deal honeymoon period should be planned and managed.  
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Planning the internal and outward communications 
It seems to be very context-dependent how the post-deal communication plan is created. 
Who takes part in the planning varies a lot; in companies D and E the plan was crafted 
mainly by the Chairman and CEO, while in companies B and C the group involved was a lot 
wider. In none of the cases was the plan put explicitly on paper.   
Many times the key people, customers and other stakeholders are informed of the ownership 
change already prior to closing the deal. 
Selecting the board members 
In most cases studied here, the board composition had already been agreed upon at time of 
the deal. Only in Company A was the process of finding a second outside member not 
finished.  
Post-deal themes 
Announcing the deal and communicating changes 
The post-deal honeymoon period kicks off almost invariably with an announcement event, 
usually already on the day of closing the deal. Only in Company A was the information 
event held two weeks after the transaction, with the intention of truly being able show the 
organization, that no big changes were taking place. This was also the only case, where Deep 
Blue’s deal team did not participate in the announcement event, but only instructed the 
CEOs and prepared them for the most common questions. In all other companies the 
Chairman had a substantial role in the event. Like the Chairman of Company D explained, 
“We wanted to give the new owners a face and show that we’re putting ourselves on the line.” 
Typically the announcement event was held at the company headquarters, from where it was 
broadcasted live to other locations if the company had multiple offices in Finland or other 
countries. Naturally there were always case-dependent nuances, but the common pattern in 
the events went as follows. First the CEO and possibly the previous main owner explained 
that the deal had been made, what it meant and what the future direction was to be on a 
broad level. After this the Chairman introduced Deep Blue, and told about their role, 
objectives and vision for the company. Finally the CEO and possibly other managers shed 
light more light on the upcoming changes, after which the employees had a possibility to ask 
questions.   
All interviewees emphasized the importance of communicating the positive aspects of the 
deal. “It’s important to make people feel like they’ve won in the change”, the CEO of 
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Company D said. These positive aspects usually include additional resources and know-how 
for growing the company, and that Deep Blue is fully domestic owner truly interested in 
developing the company further. Although the more concrete and open the message is the 
better, one thing that the CEO of Company B took up, was the question of whether it is 
necessarily beneficial to proclaim Deep Blue’s financial objectives so explicitly to the whole 
organization. “Of course the investment profit goals are important, but underlining them too 
forcefully may only enforce peoples perception of PE firms as cold, brutal owners seeking 
profits by any means necessary, often at the expense of the employees. It’s important not to 
throw more gasoline into that fire.”  
To show dedication toward the whole organization, the CEO and Chairman often did a Road 
Show, a tour of similar information events in all major offices, even abroad. Many 
interviewees also explained that a Road Show is also an extremely good way for the 
Chairman to get to know the CEO and company. “When you get to know people better, it 
enables a natural dialogue – it’s always better if the talk isn’t only centered around EBITDA 
percentages”, the Chairman of Company D relates.  
In case organizational changes are taking or going to take place, it’s important to inform the 
employees about these as soon as possible. “Not only do people want to know whether they 
themselves have a job, but of particular interest is also to whom they will report to”, the 
previous CEO of Company B explains. It’s also critical to identify the key “star players” that 
the company’s success relies most on, and make sure that value is not destroyed by them 
leaving the firm if changes affect their position in a negative way. This was partly the case in 
Company B, where many of the smaller firm’s core people left as a result of the 
transformation brought by the integration. The former CEO of the smaller firm believed that 
with better post-deal communication and dialogue between all parties, this could have been 
avoided. 
In addition to company internal communications, external stakeholders were also informed 
of the deals. E.g. Company B informed its particularly important customers and partners of 
the ownership change already prior to the deal, whereas press releases and other stakeholder 
announcements were released 15 minutes after the starting of the internal announcement 
event. 
All interviewees acknowledged the importance of post-deal communications. What is 
noteworthy, however, is that Deep Blue’s role in communications doesn’t seem to extend 
much beyond the Day 1 announcements. After the first announcement events communicating 
changes is the responsibility of the management team, and oftentimes the next time that the 
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board or Deep Blue make an appearance to the whole organization, are either informal 
company events or the unveiling of a new strategic plan in case the company goes through a 
strategy process. 
Agreeing on ways of working, roles and responsibilities 
In all five cases studied here, the ways working, roles, responsibilities, governance practices 
and change requirements were discussed only on an abstract, general level prior to the deal. 
With the beginning of the post-deal period came also the need to agree on these matters on a 
more concrete level. In most cases the interviewed management team members hoped for 
more structure and rigor in how these practicalities were agreed upon. According to many 
CFOs and managers, especially the roles related to the company finances would have needed 
more clarifying right from the start.   
Building relationships with the key managers 
Acknowledging the importance of sufficiently close personal relationships and trust between 
the managers, board members and Deep Blue, Company C organized a 3-day board-
management team retreat. “It was a good thing we did that – you definitely build closer 
relationships more quickly that way”, the Chairman recounted. “It was also a good setting to 
talk strategy and objectives in a more relaxed atmosphere.” In all other cases no outings were 
organized, but the message from the managers side was that relationships were still formed 
well. As the Company A Chairman explains, “It’s mostly a matter of spending enough time 
with the people and making sure they feel it’s ok to pick up the phone and call us.”  
Developing the management team and its ways of working 
The operative management being one of the biggest success-factors – at least according to all 
interviewed Deep Blue partners – the deal team usually commissioned a management audit 
from an outside expert. The audit shed light on the individual managers’ personalities, 
capabilities and traits, and brought forth problems in how the management team worked 
together. Often the audit was followed by the same consultant working with the management 
team to overcome the discovered challenges. Principally Deep Blue strives to keep the 
management team intact, but as in Company D, changes may need to be made if the team 
doesn't’ function well together or if individual managers don’t perform at the wanted level.  
Beginning board work 
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Most of the interviewed managers gave very positive feedback to Deep Blue on the 
increased structure and effectiveness of board work in their companies. The case companies 
also now all have more board meetings than what they used to before Deep Blue. In most 
companies the number of board meetings per year used to be four, whereas during Deep 
Blue’s holding period it increased to ten. E.g. the CEO of Company D described “We have a 
really strong board, which truly makes decisions, pushes things further, and demands a lot, 
but also supports the management team in their work.” 
It seems that only in Company E have there been substantial challenges in getting the board 
to function properly. The management team recounts that a lot of time was spent on finding 
the ways of working and how the managers should report to the board. However, they could 
not recall there being any detailed and comprehensive discussion about these matters before 
or during the first board meeting. One deal team member affirms this in saying: “We should 
have played a bigger role in planning the agenda for the first meeting. We came into the 
situation a bit under-prepared, and didn’t discuss the basic practicalities on a sufficient level. 
[...] We probably didn’t realize how big of a change it was for the management team, who 
was used to not having anyone to answer to. It took a long while before they internalized the 
change requirements because we didn’t communicate and demand them clearly enough.” 
This lack of attention to ways of working coupled with problems related to reporting quality, 
lead to board meetings straying to partly irrelevant subjects.  
In all cases the Chairmen clarified their philosophy on how the board should operate on a 
broad level. However, there were significant differences in what specific practices were 
agreed upon. E.g. the board of Company D created i.a. Rules of Procedure, Year Clock and 
Corporate Governance documents, whereas Company E didn’t agree on or discuss these 
subjects on such an explicit level. The Chairman of Company D explained the benefit of 
having e.g. a Corporate Governance manual everyone is committed to: “When the board 
goes through these subjects together in detail and agrees on the shared rules of the game, it’s 
easier to operate efficiently afterwards, when everyone’s on the same page.” When inquired 
from the deal team and managers of Company E, the unanimous opinion was that dealing 
with these matters more comprehensively in the very first board meeting would certainly 
have been beneficial. “E.g. creating a Year Clock detailing specific themes for future board 
meetings, would definitely bring more goal-orientation into the how the board works”, the 
CEO of Company E explicated.   
An area that also contained some differences between the case companies was the 
relationship of the board to the management team. E.g. in companies A and E the 
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communication was clearly channeled more intensely through the Chairman-CEO link than 
in Company A, where the managers were in a more open contact with anyone in Deep 
Blue’s deal team.  
Developing the reporting practices 
In creating more pressure on the financial and other reporting practices, Deep Blue doesn’t 
differ from the norm of PE firms. In all case companies studied here Deep Blue started 
driving the development of reporting systems and practices more forcefully, paying closer 
attention to reporting accuracy while shifting the focus from the past to forecasting the future 
and from profit to cash flow. 
The reasons for emphasizing the importance of reliable reporting are manifold. First of all, 
with the more aggressive finance structure comes stricter demands on reporting to the 
financiers. But the main reason, however, is that reliable reporting is the foundation of 
effective board work. As the case Company E exemplifies, when the board reporting isn’t on 
a required level, discussions diverge into irrelevant subjects, and the meetings become 
strenuous, as reported by one deal team member. “To be able to make decisions, the board 
needs to have accurate information on the firm’s situation. If this isn’t the case, decision-
making becomes slow, and moves to adapt to changes are always done too late”, he 
continued. The previous CEO of Company C also explained that the reason why PE firms 
put so much effort into developing the reporting practices is that it oftentimes directly 
influences the value of the company. “At time of exit the reports, measures and numbers 
should create a uniform story for the buyer, with one board meeting ending one chapter of 
the book. When the reporting practices are on a high level, the buyer can easily see where 
the numbers come from, and how the company has been managed during the holding period. 
Also, if you can show that the forecasts have been accurate in the past, it’s easier to argue for 
the validity of projections into the future made at time of the exit.” 
Despite this pressure and emphasis on reporting quality, Deep Blue clearly has challenges in 
getting its portfolio companies to produce reports at the required level: not a single case 
company in this study was said to have sufficiently high-quality reporting practices (average 
holding period of the case companies at time of the interviews was a bit less than 2 years). 
The Chairman of Company B contrasts the situation with mergers and acquisitions: “In 
M&A the buying firm usually brings its reporting and measurement systems with force into 
the new unit, and thus it only takes a few months before the acquired firm is already 
producing the needed reports. However, we do not have a standard reporting system that 
we’d roll out into all of our buyout targets, nor would that make sense. Furthermore, our 
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portfolio companies being very different in many respects, the required measures and reports 
vary a lot.” However, he does admit that many of the basic measurements and changes in 
reporting are the same across all Deep Blue’s portfolio companies. “We should probably 
look into developing a more standardized approach to what we demand from the firms. This 
would make it easier for us to communicate our requirements, and speed up the development 
process.” 
Again, some differences were identifiable across the cases related to how the process of 
developing the reporting practices was launched after the deal. E.g. in Companies C and D, 
one deal team member quickly arranged a meeting with the CFO, during which they jointly 
“went through the numbers and systems” and discussed the development requirements. This 
is a much more proactive approach than employed by the deal team in e.g. Company E, 
where no such meetings were held, but the development needs were communicated during 
board meetings. As the CFO of Company E relates, “It would have gone so much smoother 
had Deep Blue, possibly already before the deal, let us know that ‘these are the reports we 
want, in this format’, concretized through examples. Then after the deal before the first 
board meeting, one of Deep Blue’s deal team members could have sat down and gone 
through the reporting requirements with me. Amending the requirements in each board 
meeting only creates frustration in all parties.” 
Crystallizing and refining the company’s strategy (strategy process) 
Virtually without exception some kind of strategy process was gone through during first 
months of the holding period – only in Company A were the first strategy meetings held as 
late as almost a year after the deal. Depending on the situation, the process may be a 
comprehensive, formal exercise or alternatively simply a few strategy meetings among the 
board and management team. In case no need is seen for changing the vision and strategy of 
the company, this work focuses mainly on setting financial and growth objectives for the 
holding period. 
Like the CEO of Company D depicted, “A PE investor rarely turns an acquired company’s 
strategy around, but refines it and broadens the management team’s perspective, in case their 
plans have in aspects been left weak.” Although Deep Blue always acquires the majority of 
its portfolio companies and endeavors to form a clear understanding and position the 
companies’ strategic plans, it doesn’t act like a dictator in imposing its judgments on the 
managers. Rather, the strategy work is usually organized so that the board either instructs the 
managers on how the process should be executed and what kinds of outcomes are needed, or 
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then the board and managers jointly work to contrive the plans, which the board then 
approves.  
In both companies B and E, where the projected changes were the biggest, the strategy 
creation process was executed in a particularly formal and extensive manner, with a large 
number of people participating in the workshops and work. In both cases a consultant was 
brought in to facilitate and structure the work. The difference, however, was that the 
consultants at Company B had extensive experience on facilitating such processes, whereas 
the consultant at Company E was more familiar with doing sales consulting. The interviewed 
deal team members and managers were quite frank about the problems this wrong choice for 
a consultant lead to in Company E. Furthermore, as the management team was already 
swamped in work after the intense negotiation process, the common opinion was that they 
should have maybe hired a consultant who would also have actively contributed to the 
background work during the process. This was the case in Company B, where the process 
was deemed a success.  
The post-deal strategy processes conducted in companies A, C and D were much more 
lightweight. E.g. in Company C the strategy work was very informal, taking place during the 
three-day outing of the board and management team. “During the first months it was mainly 
business as usual as we tested the existing hypotheses and continued the development and 
expansion projects already in place at the time of the deal. We didn’t have any clear need for 
an extensive strategy workout”, the Chairman recounted. Furthermore, as one deal team 
member in Company C explained, “At first it’s good to quickly crystallize the company’s 
strategy to the new board and owners. However, carrying out an extensive strategy process 
before you know the company can be a bit risky – especially if the new board should be able 
to contribute to the work.” 
According to many partners at Deep Blue, strategy work needs to adapt to what the 
prerequisites are at each company. Especially in smaller companies, where the managers are 
usually on average less experienced in strategic thinking, the use of abstract concepts and 
frameworks may be counter-productive. “In some cases you need to start from the very 
basics, discussing what the concept strategy entails and so forth”, the Chairman of Company 
A explained. Generally the better equipped the managers were for doing strategy work in the 
case companies, the smaller was Deep Blue’s role in the process. Only in Company E was 
there some discrepancy in this respect. The interviewed managers were all surprised how 
little Deep Blue’s deal team actually contributed to the strategy making: “Strategy work in 
that format was unfamiliar to us, so it would've been good if Deep Blue had participated 
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more. Furthermore, our business was so familiar to us, that we'd needed an outside, out-of-
the-box view. Participating more in the process would have also taught Deep Blue a lot 
about the business”, the CFO contemplated. 
Oftentimes when carrying out a strategy process, the goal is not only to create a strategic 
plan, but also to get e.g. people from newly merged companies to get to know each other and 
build cross-boarder relationships. This was the case both in Companies B and E, where the 
process involved dozens of managers, previously unfamiliar to each other, working together 
to find synergies and build a shared strategic plan.  
Many interviewees reminded that crafting and agreeing on a strategic plan is only the start, 
and that most of the real challenges start when companies start to implement them. E.g. 
according to the previous CEO of Company B’s smaller firm, “The biggest reason for 
strategies not working is that organizations don’t succeed in implementing them. Here we 
partly had this situation – the strategy process resulted in a really sound plan, but putting it 
into action was slower and harder than expected.” Many interviewees also emphasized that 
strategy making doesn’t stop when an “official” process comes to an end – “It’s an ongoing 
process where you constantly test the hypotheses the strategy rests upon”, the Chairman of 
Company B described. 
Making organizational changes 
In all case companies some organizational changes were made after the deal. In companies A, 
B, C and E these changes were brought on already because of the deeper integration between 
previously more autonomous companies, whereas in Company D the fundamental reason for 
restructuring was gaining efficiency through a simpler organizational structure. In Company 
B the organizational transformation was also a result of the new strategic focus areas decided 
on in the strategy process.  
The key architect behind the organizational changes was in all companies the CEO. However, 
especially the Chairman was also highly involved in crafting these plans in cooperation with 
the CEO, who then finally presented his proposal for the board to decide on.  
In none of the case companies were any large-scale layoffs made. The need for layoffs 
stemmed mainly from the unification of the supporting functions in the administrative 
departments. None of the interviewees found that there were any real problems or issues in 
the way these layoffs were handled.  
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Building momentum for change 
All the interviewed Deep Blue’s partners confirmed the importance of the first few post-deal 
months when it comes to initiating and building momentum for change in the organization. 
E.g. the Chairman of Company D explained: “One of the focal things during the first few 
months is that you need to get the changes rolling and build momentum. You have a window 
of opportunity, and that’s why there’s so much talk of 100-day programs. Everyone in the 
organization is anxious to see what’s going to happen. If you don’t initiate and communicate 
the changes then, you lose the opportunity and the momentum. ‘We got excited for nothing’, 
the organization will think.”  
In three of the five case companies, Companies A, C and D, the first months, however, 
didn’t involve big changes. On the contrary, the main message in all of these cases was that 
the work would continue mainly as it was. Then again in Companies B and E the large-scale 
strategy process, begun quickly after the deal, was the main avenue of initiating and 
communicating changes to the organization. In none of the case companies were so called 
“quick wins”, small-scale development actions with the intention to show the organization 
that the winds of change are blowing, orchestrated intentionally during the first months.  
Supporting the management team with know-how and resources 
Being an active owner, Deep Blue’s deal teams clearly strive to add value by bringing their 
know-how to the table, oftentimes going even deeper into the business than just being active 
board members. The themes in which they contribute and support the management team the 
most of course depend on the company, its situation and the management team’s capabilities. 
Generally speaking, however, the key contribution areas in the five case companies studied 
here were finances, reporting practices, strategy work, add-on acquisitions, organizational 
structures, and the use of outside resources (such as a consultants). Depending on the 
background of the deal team members and their knowledge of the company and its industry, 
operative issues were also often on the agenda.   
One area meriting a special treatment here is add-on acquisitions. Deep Blue often takes a 
big role in all the way from screening for possible targets, launching negotiations, and 
commissioning due diligences to negotiating the financing packages with banks. In some 
cases, like in the first add-on acquisitions done in Company A, Deep Blue acted so 
independently during the pre-deal phase that the managers of Company A couldn’t keep up 
with everything that was agreed upon with the selling side. This lead to some difficulties, 
and in later add-on acquisitions the managers were much more involved in the negotiations. 
This way they were also able to better contribute to assessing whether the target was a 
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suitable addition to the Group. The interviewed managers, especially the CFO, called for 
clearer post-deal plans when doing add-on acquisitions: “The integration process should be 
planned more rigorously beforehand – abstract-level discussions during the negotiations 
never steer post-deal actions firmly enough.”   
In Company E, the managers wished that Deep Blue had brought more know-how into how 
the integration process between the two biggest companies was to be organized. “One of the 
key questions is how Deep Blue could've participated more in the integration efforts, 
because one of their key-competences lies in acquisitions. E.g. providing some kind of best 
practices and maybe forming a board’s working group to steer the process would have 
ensured a more efficient integration”, the CEO contemplated, while naturally also 
acknowledging that the greatest responsibility for the slow progress lay with him. However, 
this seems to indicate, especially as such a big part of Deep Blue’s buyouts are characterized 
by mergers of two or more companies, that it might be beneficial for Deep Blue to provide 
the managers with more support on planning and leading the integration efforts.   
Clarifying co-ownership issues  
In all of the case companies most, if not all of the top managers committed themselves to the 
company also financially. In the words of the Chairman of Company D, the managers were 
by no means forced to invest, but were “offered the opportunity to become co-owners in the 
company”. He also stressed that although the theory emphasizes the role of management co-
ownership, there may also be negative effects: “When times are good and business goes well, 
co-ownership works well. But when things turn south, it may end up diverting people’s 
attention to wrong issues, stirring up panic of loss of invested money. You must always 
highlight that everyone is to make investments only according to their own limits. Also, it 
should never be an issue that creates inequality in case some people are not willing or able to 
invest.” 
Co-ownership being such a delicate issue, Deep Blue organized information events to the 
managers that the chance to invest was given to. E.g. in Company D, the Chairman 
personally held a presentation on the subject, explaining the basics of the deal, how the value 
of the company is determined and how it would develop under different hypotheses. The 
Company’s CFO at the time, despite praising Deep Blue for organizing these excellent 
information events, hoped for still more concrete exemplifications through scenarios. “For 
CFOs these things are quite easy to understand, but for many people who haven’t been so 
much involved in the financing side, some concepts, such as the valuation multiple, may be 
quite hard to comprehend if not explained through more concrete examples.”   
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4.3. Synthesis of the Case Studies 
Many of the problems witnessed in the case companies can actually be seen as symptoms of 
the fundamental challenges related to the situation of a new group of people becoming the 
owners and taking an active role in an organization. The buyout situation entails great 
information asymmetries both ways. The management team has greater knowledge of the 
company, its culture, and the way things are being done in the organization. Deep Blue on 
the other hand has extensive experience of buyouts in general and knows what it requires 
from the managers (e.g. when it comes to reporting practices). Thus, only through 
communication can the two parties and all their members synchronize their assumptions and 
come to work efficiently together. However, as the cases studied here indicate, bringing 
everyone on the same page may at times prove to be difficult.  
The communication challenge is made even bigger by the fact that Deep Blue is yet to 
develop a clear process for how it “goes into” a target company. The methods used for 
planning and managing the post-deal honeymoon process vary a lot across cases. This leads 
to many problems, such as: 
 Deep Blue’s deal team members may have differing opinions and assumptions on 
how things should be done. These differences may not surface before they have 
already led into clear problems.  
 All relevant things may not be explicitly discussed and agreed upon in case there is 
no clearly defined framework providing the steps that need to be taken in all target 
companies. 
 Not having a standardized way of doing things makes it difficult to communicate 
what’s going to happen, the change requirements and ways of working that Deep 
Blue enforces on the management team. Like the CFO of Company E said, “Even if 
the demands are undesirable from our perspective, it’s better to be clear about what 
they are than leave them undiscussed and vague.” 
 The honeymoon phase, the period of learning to work together, may drag on for an 
overly long time. Deep Blue’s holding period of companies being quite short, it’s 




This chapter makes recommendations to the case PE firm, Deep Blue, related to the planning 
and management of the post-deal honeymoon with respect to the themes depicted in the 
results chapter and in general. It also creates a framework, relates the findings to previous 
academic research, and discusses their generalizability. 
5.1. Recommendations to Deep Blue 
5.1.1. Recommendations with respect to the focal themes in the 
planning and management of the post-deal honeymoon period 
Pre-deal themes 
Acquiring sufficient knowledge about the company and its business 
For the most part Deep Blue seems to be very professional in how it acquires knowledge 
about its target companies during the pre-deal phase. However, what it probably should 
focus more on is forming a better understanding of the company’s leadership culture. Only 
this way can Deep Blue accurately communicate the change requirements demanded when 
becoming the new majority owner. Now e.g. the commissioned management audits focus 
more on the individual managers than on the leadership processes and the culture of the firm. 
The importance of analyzing the cultural aspects seems to be further heightened when the 
deal entails an integration of two or more companies.  
Building a shared vision and business plan with the management team 
Depending on the situation, it may not always be possible to devise a clear vision and 
business plan before the deal. E.g. in case Company B what was clear was that the two firms 
would be integrated at least to some extent, certain themes such as sales process would need 
special attention, and that the holding period would be kicked off with an extensive strategy 
process forming a detailed strategic plan for the future. Also, in some cases it is not possible 
to discuss these things extensively with the whole management team before the deal close. 
However, many of Deep Blue’s partners did raise the question whether they should strive to 
form clearer plans already during the negotiation phase. 
What was surprising in light of all the buzz around 100-day plans was that in none of the 
case companies studied here were such plans formed, nor were any kinds of checklists used 
to make sure all relevant areas were discussed and agreed upon during the early stages of the 
holding period. Many of the interviewed partners at Deep Blue had a somewhat skeptical 
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stance on the creation of 100-day plans before or after the deal, and seemed to also have 
differences in their views of what a 100-day plan actually consists of. On the other hand, 
almost all of the interviewed managers saw that a 100-day plan would have brought more 
clarity and goal-orientation into the early months after the deal. This disparity most likely 
stems from the fact that Deep Blue’s partners have an extensive knowledge of what the steps 
are that will be taken during the honeymoon period, but the managers, being involved in a 
buyout usually for the first time in their careers, are novices in that respect.  
When asked the interviewed Deep Blue partner’s about 100-day plans, they often replied that 
three months is way too short of a timeframe to execute any real changes in many cases. 
However, the plan must not be viewed as something stating what needs to be completed 
during the timeframe, but can be extended into what aspects should be planned or decided on, 
and which initiatives should have begun but not necessarily finished during the 100-day 
period.  
A good practice could be to form an initial 100-day plan already during the pre-deal phase 
either among the deal team or cooperatively with the managers included in the acquisition 
process. After the deal this initial plan would then be sharpened and completed together with 
the whole management team to ensure their commitment and the comprehensiveness of the 
scheme. Done in this way a 100-day plan: 
 Sets objectives and timetables for things that need to be planned, decided on or 
executed during the timeframe. 
 Is a way to make Deep Blue’s deal team, the board, and the management team 
discuss the right things, and get them to work together and commit to the jointly 
crafted plans.  
 Is a communication tool that helps in bringing forth and synchronizing assumptions 
of all parties. 
 Ensures that the ways of working are discussed in order to create a solid foundation 
for cooperation and to prevent surprises. In this ways everyone is able to fully 
concentrate on the real business themes as soon as possible. 
 Ensures that Deep Blue’s deal team puts enough time and effort into the company 
and the most critical areas. Deep Blue’s partners often have a multitude of portfolio 
firms to govern, so a clear plan forces them to focus enough time on the newly 
acquired firm. This has been found to significantly increase investment success by 
e.g. Heel & Kehoe (2005). 
 Increases goal-orientation and ensures that things get prioritized. 
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 Creates a sense of urgency necessary for accomplishing change in organizations 
(e.g. Ashkenas et al., 1989; Kotter, 2008). 
 Ensures that the momentum and window of opportunity created by the ownership 
change is exploited to the fullest. Like the CEO of Company D put it: “Because 
people expect change, you are presented with an opportunity for doing things very 
differently.” 
 Can even explicitly take a stance on how the relationships between Deep Blue, 
board, management team and other managers are to be formed – should e.g. special 
team building events be organized?  
A 100-day program can be viewed as a project launching Deep Blue’s holding period. And 
like all projects it should have a project leader, and a clear-cut end date when its status is 
scrutinized in relation to the objectives, the project’s success is assessed, and the next steps 
are planned. A 100-day plan, put explicitly on paper, also forms a platform for learning – if 
certain kinds of development initiatives are always lagging in progress across case 
companies, this can lead to valuable insights on what to put special attention on.  
A sample 100-day plan template created based on the findings of this study can be found in 
Appendix X. It is important to note that the tasks described in the template should of course 
be customized case by case, and need to be more detailed in order to lead to specific actions.  
Discussing ways of working, roles, change requirements and practicalities 
As described in the Results section, many managers hoped that Deep Blue had better 
informed them about their way of doing things, their role and especially the change 
requirements already before the deal. The creation of a 100-day plan was raised as a possible 
tool form bringing clarity into the situation, but also a “Deep Blue’s way of working” 
manual was suggested by some managers as a way for the deal team to communicate what it 
is they will demand from the management. The manual could also explain the essentials of 
private equity buyouts, what it means when a PE firm acquires a company, and how value is 
created in buyouts. This would create a better understanding of the situation for the 
managers who are not familiar with the world of private equity. By giving a comprehensive 
account of the principles and reasons behind why things are done in a certain way, the 
managers would have a much easier time adapting to the changes Deep Blue demands. 
The manual wouldn’t necessarily need to go into tiny details on how Deep Blue operates and 
what changes it will enforce, but could for many parts merely describe and point to the 
subjects that need to be discussed and agreed upon together with the management team. This 
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way individual partners and deal teams would maintain their freedom of doing things partly 
in their own way – chaining professionals into a rigid model of working is most likely not 
the best choice, nor would it probably be possible.  
Planning the internal and outward communications 
Despite the context-dependent nature of how the post-deal communication plan is created 
Deep Blue might wish to form some common templates and checklists for how the 
announcement events and other communications are planned. As the plans are always 
crafted in cooperation with managers, having documentation of the best practices would 
again help in doing this more efficiently.  
Post-deal themes 
Announcing the deal and communicating changes 
According to the interviewees the Day 1 announcement events were generally speaking 
successful. In all but one case company Deep Blue’s deal team, lead by the Chairman, took a 
substantial role in the presentations with the intention of “giving a face” to the new owners. 
This practice got very good feedback from the interviewed managers.  
It was a common convention to inform the key managers of the deal before the general 
announcement event. Deep Blue could also consider broadening this circle further into 
middle managers, as has been found effective in the field of M&A by e.g. Haldevang (2009) 
and Tetenbaum (1999). The authors argue that rather than trusting the official 
announcements, employees first look to their supervisors for information about the changes 
taking place, meaning that it is critical that team-leaders have a positive stance toward the 
acquisition, and are well equipped to provide satisfactory answers to their subordinates’ 
questions. 
As described in the Results, Deep Blue’s role in post-deal communications usually ends after 
the Day 1 and possible Road Show announcement events. M&A literature then again (e.g. 
Ashkenas et al., 1998), emphasizes heavily that information events are only the first steps. 
An effective communication process needs more than just information bulletins and 
announcement events: it requires the creation of forums for truly two-way dialogue between 
the two organizations. According to Haldevang (2009), most communication fails because it 
is conceived from the position of “ease of delivery” rather than effectiveness and the needs 
of the recipients. Assessing whether Deep Blue should play a bigger role in communications 
also after the Day 1 announcements is recommended. At least the deal team or the board 
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should make sure that the management team understands the importance of effective 
communications.  
Ashkenas et al. (1998) also emphasize that from an employee’s perspective the first thing 
they want to hear is an answer to the question “Do I have a job?”. In addition to fears of job-
loss, there are also many other aspects that produce anxiety, stress and even anger; 
employees’ mental scripts tell them that when a company is acquired, the acquiring company 
comes and puts its own people in charge, alters policies and procedures, restructures the 
organization, and generally takes over. “Who are these new owners? What are their 
intentions? Can we trust what they say? Do we still have jobs, and are they the same as 
before? Why did our previous owners sell? Did we do a bad job, or did they betray us?” 
(Ashkenas et al., 1998)  
In aspects related to communications the buyout situation can be seen as very similar to 
M&As, with most likely the same questions and anxieties arising in employees minds. This 
coupled with the fact that private equity investors are generally often seen in a negative light, 
the comment that the Company B CEO made on not highlighting Deep Blue’s financial 
objectives seems valid. Only if these financial goals are framed in such a light that it creates 
a positive outlook for the employees (i.a. more interesting tasks, job security and better pay-
for-performance schemes through growth) is there a clear reason for announcing them with 
such strength.  
When the communications is done properly and respectfully, it creates a strong basis for 
launching change initiatives. Again in the field of M&A, where post-deal communication 
processes have been studied a lot more extensively than in the PE world, Teerikangas (2006) 
finds that employees do not necessarily welcome a merger only with feelings of uncertainty, 
anxiety and stress, but can exhibit considerable motivation towards the changes if the pre-
deal and post-deal phases are managed well and in a fair manner. She also states that it is 
crucial to manage both employee expectations and attitudes; it is far better if the acquiring 
firm is seen as a “welcoming host” than a “conqueror”. Facing uncertainty, the staff will use 
whatever information available to them to form their “informed” opinions, and thus, 
attention should not only be paid to large-scale matters but also to minor changes and acts, 
and what they communicate. At times, success can be dependent on how representatives of 
the buyer behave – do they exhibit respectful behavior by, e.g., shaking hands with shop 
floor staff? (Teerikangas, 2006) 
 
71 
Agreeing on ways of working, roles and responsibilities 
A lot more effort should be put into agreeing on the shared ways of working, and the roles 
and responsibilities of different parties. Providing the managers who were not included in the 
negotiation process with a “Deep Blue’s way of working” manual (discussed closer in the 
Pre-deal part of this chapter) after the deal to create a foundation for discussions was seen as 
a good idea by the managers in Company B and E. Special attention should be paid to the 
responsibilities related to how the company finances are handled.  
Building relationships with the key managers 
Despite the message from most management interviewees being quite positive on how Deep 
Blue’s deal teams built relationships with them, Deep Blue ought to at least consider 
injecting a certain level of systematization into how the all-important connective tissue 
between the management team, board and deal team is cultivated. They could build on e.g. 
the practice that Ashkenas et al. (1998) describe is used by GE Capital – one of the most 
widely cited companies to be an expert in integrating their acquisitions – to facilitate 
socialization and interactions at the management level quickly after the closing of a deal. As 
one of the first things done, GE Capital organizes orientation and planning sessions for the 
members of both firm’s management teams. The intent of these sessions is to welcome the 
new managers into GE Capital, give the teams a chance to socialize with their new 
colleagues, share knowledge, and very importantly, share their feelings and reactions to the 
deal. The newly acquired managers are asked to talk about their organization, in particular 
about the positive aspects of their company – “what they feel good about, and what should 
be built upon”. After letting them share their thoughts, GE Capital executives in turn 
describe what it means to be a part of their firm, what policies and standards need to be 
adhered to. The teams then move into jointly crafting a 100-day plan, providing them an 
early possibility for cooperation (Ashkenas et al., 1998). Also, the good experiences of 
organizing team outings had in Company C could be seen as encouragement to using these 
outings as a tool on a more systematic basis, although the main thing according to many 
interviewees is simply that enough time is spent on the newly acquired portfolio company 
during the first months. 
Beginning board work 
Deep Blue taking the position of Chairman of the board, and the deal team knowing how it 
wishes the board to function, it is important that Deep Blue makes sure that the ways 
working, governance practices and other practicalities are dealt with thoroughly enough in or 
before the first board meeting. Deep Blue could e.g. develop a template for what things need 
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to be agreed upon to ensure that the board’s working habits are efficient and goal-oriented. 
The findings of this study seem to indicate that at least documents such as Rules of 
Procedure, Year Clock and Corporate Governance manual are usually beneficial. 
The board should also discuss what its relationship to the management team is – how the 
communications are organized, who is in contact with whom, how the management team is 
informed of the board’s decisions etc. There seemed to be quite big differences in how 
individual partners at Deep Blue saw this theme. Some were proponents of open 
communication between the management team members and board members, whereas some 
found that the communication should be channeled more through the Chairman-CEO link. 
These kinds of differences in opinions, if not discussed openly, may end up resulting in 
unexpected challenges. Thus, Deep Blue should, if not agree on a common way of operating, 
at least agree on what the practice is case by case.  
To sum up, the board should before or in its first meeting go through and agree on: 
 General Rules of Procedure 
 Whether or not to deploy a Year Clock  
 Corporate Governance issues 
 Reporting practices and how their development is to be led 
 The board’s relationship to the management team and other managers 
 How the board is to visible to the organization 
 The board’s involvement in a possible strategy process 
 How and when should the board conduct self-assessments 
 How and when should the board material be delivered to the members 
 Whether the board should form working groups around certain development themes 
Developing the reporting practices 
Because of the apparent difficulties in getting the portfolio firms to produce sufficiently 
good-quality reports, Deep Blue should device better methods to make sure the development 
initiatives lead to results faster. They could for example: 
 Better clarify the reasons for why high-quality reporting is such an important thing 
(explained in the Results) 
 Form a board’s working group to manage, supervise and support the development 
initiatives 
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 Have a meeting as soon as possible after the deal with the CFO to clarify the 
development needs through concrete examples of “good reporting” from e.g. 
previous portfolio companies 
 Develop a more standardized approach to what reports and metrics are demanded in 
all of their portfolio companies 
In keeping with the 100-day plan methodology, approaching the first steps in the 
development of reporting practices as a project, may be highly beneficial. By crafting a 
project plan including the objectives, timetables, responsibilities, reporting and monitoring 
practices and how Deep Blue, being experts in issues related to financial reporting, will 
support the project with their know-how, would ensure a more systematized and efficient 
start into the development process. Quickly getting high quality reports and data from the 
company will have many beneficial implications, as explained in the Results.   
Crystallizing and refining the company’s strategy (strategy process) 
The strategy processes executed in the case companies varied a lot in many dimensions, 
including i.a.:  
 How comprehensive, formal and heavy the process was 
 When the strategy work was started 
 Who the main people planning the process were 
 Who were involved in the work, and what Deep Blue’s role was 
 Who the process facilitator was (Deep Blue, consultant or management team itself) 
 What tools or frameworks were used 
 What the main outcomes were (financial and growth objectives vs. full-blown 
strategic plan) 
It seems advisable to put more effort into explicitly discussing and planning the strategy 
process. E.g. in Company E, according to one deal team member and the interviewed 
managers, the decisions on how the process was organized and who was to facilitate it were 
done somewhat too hastily, leading into a near complete failure. When choosing the 
facilitators, it is important to make sure they have sufficient experience in leading strategy 
processes, not just consultancy in general. Also worth considering is the possibility of hiring 
consultants who not only facilitate the process, but also assist in the background work, 
providing analyses and data to support the decision-making. This way the managers are not 
burdened so much by the process, and can, after a possibly laborious deal-making process, 
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concentrate more on running the company. This was the case in Company B, where it seems 
both the managers and deal team members were truly content with how the process went.  
Deep Blue should carefully evaluate and communicate what their role in the strategy work is. 
Especially the managers of Company E were surprised how little Deep Blue participated in 
the process, and would have gladly seen them taking a bigger role. E.g. according to the 
CFO “Strategy work in that format was unfamiliar to us, so it would've been good if Deep 
Blue had participated more. Furthermore, our business was so familiar to us, that we'd 
needed an outside, out-of-the-box view.“ Also in the light of Company A, it seems 
particularly important for Deep Blue to take a stronger role in the process if the managers are 
not seasoned in the art of strategy work and strategic planning. Furthermore, according to the 
managers the one-day strategy workshop held quite soon after the deal was a good start, but 
going deeper, past the objective setting level into forming plans of how to achieve those 
goals, would have been beneficial. The CTO contemplated that at least they should’ve 
agreed on when and how to continue the strategy making. Making sure that everyone has a 
clear picture of where the company is going is essential. 
In addition to the obvious benefit of creating a strategic direction and plan for the company, 
many interviewees also reported secondary benefits from strategy processes. These included 
i.a. 
 Deep Blue getting to know the managers, organization and business   
 People having the feeling of being given the possibility to influence the decisions 
made 
 When integrating two or more companies, the managers from different firms get to 
know each other and learn to work together 
Building momentum for change 
In addition to planning the post-deal communications from the perspective of building 
momentum for change, Deep Blue could contemplate whether it might be beneficial to more 
actively and consciously induce so called “quick wins”, easy-to-accomplish development 
initiatives sending a message to the organization that things are truly being done and 
changed. This procedure is described e.g. by e.g. Matthews et al. (2009), who propose a 
model for PE firms for prioritizing the many operational initiatives that could be undertaken 
in the newly acquired company. The authors explain that “Although private equity firms and 
their Operating Partners will inevitably devote the bulk of their attention to the high 
value/high difficulty projects that often determine the ultimate fate of the transaction, the 
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inclusion of a limited number of low value/low difficulty projects in the 100-day plan will 
deliver an important benefit in the form of relatively easy gains.” These easy gains, despite 
the relatively minor ultimate impact on the LBO’s success, serve to energize the company 
management and employees, creating momentum for change from early on (Matthews et al., 
2009).  
Deep Blue could thus assume a policy of requesting from the management team a collection 
of all possible development actions, big and small, that they regard as potentially value 
adding initiatives. After this, using the framework proposed by Matthews et al. (2009), the 
deal team and management teams would, as a part of crafting the 100-day plan, pick a 
manageable number of small-scale projects to serve the function of producing these quick 
wins. As one deal team member in Company D explained, it is already common that the 
managers present Deep Blue with development initiatives that they had not had the 
possibility to start or complete under the previous owners. Now this practice could be 
solidified and combined to the 100-day plan and “quick win” methodologies.   
Supporting the management team with know-how and resources 
The studied cases indicated that the key contribution areas of Deep Blue are generally 
finances, reporting practices, strategy work, add-on acquisitions, organizational structures, 
use of outside resources such as consultants, and often also operative issues – a wide 
selection of the themes that is. Many of these areas have already been discussed above, but 
one theme that merits additional attention is Deep Blue’s role in add-on acquisitions.  
Having extensive experience and know-how of acquisitions, both in buying new portfolio 
companies and in growing these companies further with add-on acquisitions, Deep Blue is in 
a unique position to develop systematized approaches to add-on acquisition processes. It 
seems that the deal team’s role is biggest in the pre-deal phases of these transactions – what 
comes to post-deal integration processes, they are generally handled by the management 
team. However, Deep Blue could take a more active role especially in planning the 
integration process by providing the managers with advice, best practices and other learnings 
from past acquisitions.  
The literature on M&A provides us with an ample theory-base of best practices in 
acquisition processes. These best practices include i.a.: 
 Having a clear process leader, who ensures that the process and its challenges are 
being dealt with in a holistic manner, coordinates the teamwork and communication 
flows, and has the know-how to make the best use of all team members’ talent and 
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knowledge. There is evidence that appointing one person as the ultimate dealmaker 
is beneficial. (Dionne, 1988; McSweeney & Happonen, 2012) 
 The inclusion of an integration manager who will serve as a critical bridge between 
the pre- and post-deal phases. Unless the integration manager is a part of the 
acquisition process from early on, there is a high risk of losing the key knowledge, 
insights and relationships developed during the negotiations and due diligence 
processes, because typically the deal team disbands after the closing of the deal. 
(Ashkenas et al., 1998; McSweeney & Happonen, 2012) 
 Including human resources (HR) representatives as part of the acquisition team 
(McSweeney & Happonen, 2012). 
 Devising a clear business plan, stating the strategic logic of the purchase and 
desired financial returns and operating synergies, thus creating the foundation for 
the objectives and scope of the integration (McSweeney & Happonen, 2012). 
 Creating an integration plan outlining how the desired future state and planned 
financial returns and synergies are to be reached on the operational level. It creates a 
timetable for the staged integration with milestones, deadlines and checkpoints, and 
determines the budget, including costs related to e.g. communication and travelling. 
(McSweeney & Happonen, 2012) 
 Drawing up a 100-day plan, which addresses issues such as how customer 
operations are managed and subsequently integrated, when to organize management 
planning meetings, who to include in the integration team, and how the corporate 
cultures and values are taken into account in the process (Ashkenas et al., 1998; 
McSweeney & Happonen, 2012) 
Ashkenas et al. (1998), in making a strong case for appointing a dedicated integration 
manager, argue that “Since acquisition integration is an ongoing process and not a discrete 
stage of a deal, someone needs to manage it.” In their study of GE Capital acquisition 
processes in a number of deals, they identify the integration manager as key to successful 
acquisitions. At GE Capital, integration management is viewed as a full-time job, and is 
recognized as a distinct business function, just like operations, marketing or finance. 
Ashkenas et al. (1998) describe the key objectives attached to the integration manager’s post 
as (1) facilitating and managing integration activities, (2) helping the acquired business to 
understand GE Capital, (3) helping GE Capital to understand the target business, and (4) 
building “connective tissue” between the organizations. In their follow-up study, Ashkenas 
and Francis (2000) posit that a dedicated integration manager helps the process in four 
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principal ways: “they speed it up, create a structure for it, forge social connections between 
the two organizations, and help engineer short-term successes that produce business results.” 
Deep Blue’s portfolio companies being much smaller in size and having fewer resources 
than GE Capital, appointing a full-time integration manager may not be possible in most 
cases. Nonetheless, more clearly assigning responsibility for the integration process to an 
individual manager seems advisable. This approach could additionally be utilized in buyout 
acquisitions where two companies are merged as a result of the buyout, like in case 
Companies A, B, C, and E.  
5.1.2. General recommendations to Deep Blue 
The findings of this study point to a clear need for a more unified way of planning and 
managing the post-deal honeymoon period among Deep Blue’s partners and other team 
members. The differences in ways of working and views regarding e.g. the relationships 
between the board and managers should be discussed more thoroughly – brushing them 
under the carpet doesn’t create a firm foundation for coherent teamwork in future cases. 
Even if it isn’t possible to agree on a one and only philosophy and way of doing things, the 
approaches applied in any individual case should be explicitly agreed upon between the deal 
team members.   
By agreeing on a more standardized way of planning and managing the post-deal 
honeymoon period, Deep Blue could improve its ways of working more systematically than 
at the moment, when many things are done on a case-by-case basis. Developing a clear 
process for “going into a company” would also make it easier to communicate their demands 
to the management team. This again would speed-up the handling of practicalities, prevent 
misunderstandings, and generally optimize the way the post-deal honeymoon period is 
planned and managed. Possible tools for increasing the standardization and clarity of the 
process include: 
 The practice of creating an initial 100-day plan prior to the deal, and deepening it in 
cooperation with the management team quickly after the closing of the deal. A 
template suggestion for a 100-day plan was developed on the basis of the findings in 
this study, and can be found in the Appendices (Appendix X). 
 Frameworks and checklists depicting the necessary steps in planning and managing 
the post-deal honeymoon period.  
 A “manual” describing Deep Blue’s way of doing things, what they will demand 
from the management team, and what things need to be discussed and agreed upon 
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before and after the deal. The manual could also explain the essential theories related 
to private equity buyouts, creating a better understanding of the situation for the 
managers who are not familiar with the world of private equity. A manual of this 
kind was crafted for Deep Blue as a part of this study, but cannot be disclosed here 
due to the delicate nature of the document.  
 Templates and richer documentation on i.a. the required reporting practices, board’s 
ways of working and its relationship to the management team  
 Best practice approaches related to e.g. add-on acquisition integration management. 
6. Conclusions 
6.1. Summary of the Key Findings 
This thesis studied how private equity investors should plan and manage the post-deal 
honeymoon period in a leveraged buyout. The main research problem gave rise to three 
separate research questions, which are reviewed and answered separately below.  
Research question 1: Based on the current academic literature, how do private equity 
companies create value in leveraged buyouts, and what are the key issues with regard to 
planning and managing the post-deal honeymoon period? 
This question was answered in Chapter 2 by extensively reviewing the current academic 
literature on private equity and buyouts. After providing a general introduction to private 
equity and LBOs, the chapter described the value generation methods used by PE firms in 
building profitable investments. It was found that they can be categorized into levers of 
value capturing (financial arbitrage), and value capturing (financial engineering, increasing 
operational efficiency, increasing strategic distinctiveness, reduction of agency cost, and 
mentoring the managers). 
Next the focus shifted into how previous research has dealt with the post-deal honeymoon 
period, its importance and what practices PE firms employ in planning and managing this 
crucial phase. Despite the widely acknowledged importance of the first months after the deal 
close, not a lot of effort has been directed into researching how PE firms should manage the 
process of “going into a company”. Best practices such as spending enough time on the 
newly acquired business during the first 100 days, forming and executing robust value 
creation plans, and creating a balanced set of operational initiatives are suggested, but these 
pieces of advice remain quite superficial. A multitude of papers cite PE firms creating 
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specific 100-day plans to ensure a smooth start for the holding period, but none of these 
studies detail what these plans usually include, or optimally should contain.  
As the existing literature didn’t give an explicit account of the key issues and actions related 
to planning and managing the post-deal honeymoon period, the value creation levers 
discussed above were dissected into measures likely to be taken by a PE firm in a buyout. 
This treatment served the purpose of building a thematic foundation for the empirical 
research. 
All in all it can be concluded that the limited number of studies done on the post-deal 
honeymoon period in LBOs merely scratch the surface of the subject studied here. The PE 
industry and the academics studying the field are yet to develop a framework, standard 
process or a comprehensive set of best practices for planning and managing the post-deal 
phase.  
Research question 2: Based on the empirical case studies, what are the current 
approaches to planning and managing the post-deal honeymoon period used by Deep 
Blue, and how successful have they been from the firm's partners' and the portfolio 
companies' management team's perspectives?  
Using case study as the research method, five quite recent SME buyouts done by a Finnish 
PE investor, “Deep Blue” (name changed), were studied in depth to uncover the approaches 
to planning and managing the post-deal honeymoon period employed by the individual deal 
teams.  
The many challenges reported by the interviewees included i.a. problems in developing the 
portfolio companies’ reporting practices, agreeing on roles and responsibilities, and 
inefficient board work. Most of these problems can, however, be seen to derive from the fact 
that Deep Blue is yet to develop a clear process for how it “goes into” a new portfolio 
company. This lack of systematization, coupled with the huge information asymmetries 
inherent in the situation, can potentially lead to e.g. the above-mentioned challenges.  
Research question 3: Based on the theoretical and empirical findings, how should Deep 
Blue and other PE investors plan and manage the post-deal honeymoon period when 
acquiring a new portfolio company? 
The general findings of the study point to a clear need for a more unified and systematized 
way of planning and managing the post-deal honeymoon period. Developing a clearer 
process for “going into a company” would make it easier for Deep Blue’s deal teams to 
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communicate their demands and assumptions to the management team. This would speed up 
the handling of practicalities, prevent misunderstandings and bring about the transparency 
that many of the interviewed managers hoped for. The study recommended certain tools, 
such as the 100-day plan, for Deep Blue to ensure systematic and effective planning and 
management of the post-deal honeymoon period.  
As the situational aspects are largely similar for any PE investor acquiring a new portfolio 
company, it seems evident that the findings and recommendations here are largely 
generalizable beyond Deep Blue.  
6.2. Theoretical Contributions and Suggestions for Future 
Research 
Despite the study’s apparent limitation of focusing only on one single PE investor and its 
way of planning and managing the post-deal honeymoon periods in five of its portfolio firms, 
the findings seem easily generalizable to other PE investors as well. Surely e.g. the practice 
of having specialized teams for different stages of the pre- and post-deal phases used by 
some bigger PE firms, creates some fundamental differences related to issues such as 
relationship-building, but on a general level the results and recommendations described 
above most likely hold true even then. This is indicated by i.a. the fact that a majority of the 
themes and activities observed in the studied cases are in line with those found in prior 
academic literature, and vice versa.  
The key academic contributions of this study are as follows: 
 Synthesizing the existing literature on private equity buyouts, value creation in 
buyouts, and planning and managing the post-deal honeymoon period.  
 Creating a categorization of the activities and themes related to the planning and 
management of the post-deal honeymoon period in PE buyouts. 
 Building a better understanding of the key challenges and issues related to the start 
of the holding period. 
 Making generalizable recommendations to private equity professionals on how to 
ensure an efficient start to the holding period.  
Essentially this study constitutes a step in the direction of building the “standard active-
ownership process that applies and develops best practices”, which Heel & Kehoe (2005) 
argue “is the next step for the private equity industry”. 
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The study also raised multiple avenues for future research in the field of private equity 
buyouts. First of all, the findings here need to be validated, broadened and deepened through 
studies with a larger number of private equity firms differing in dimensions such as size of 
the firm, deal team formation practices, and buyout target characteristics. Secondly, studying 
if the systematization of the planning and management of the post-deal honeymoon period 
truly increases success, would shed light on whether this truly is a the direction PE 
companies should be turning to.  
Thirdly, an interesting theme to study would be how the involvement of deal team members 
in different activities, such as strategy-making, influences the investment success. Similarly, 
extremely interesting would be to compare the success-level of LBOs where 100-day plans 
and other tools were used to those with less formal planning methods.  
Finally, to uncover whether private equity professionals are able to use their supposed 
expertize in acquisitions in add-on acquisitions and diffuse their knowledge of integration 
management to the management team, a study comparing the success of M&As done by 
companies with PE investors as major owners to ones done by companies not affiliated with 
PE investors could be made.  
6.3. Limitations of the Study 
There are some limitations to the study. As described above, the empirical part was based 
only on one single PE firm.  Thus, to solidify the findings and recommendations, further 
studies with a larger number of diverse PE firms should be conducted. Secondly, the 
empirical part relied heavily on the conducted interviews, which are always embroided with 
bias, opinions, subjective perspectives and inaccurate recollections (Snow & Thomas, 1994). 
This problem was mitigated mainly by interviewing multiple people in all studied cases – 
both Deep Blue’s partners and the portfolio company’s management. Finally, it is always 
possible that the cognitive bias of the researcher influenced the direction and findings of the 
research. This in mind, the methods, results and interpretations were discussed and further 
validated with Deep Blue's representatives, case company management, and Aalto 
University professors and researchers. 
When assessing the transferability of the findings, it must be taken into account that the 
study examined only one PE firm and five of its portfolio companies. It is hard to say how 
well these findings and recommendations can be generalized into other cultures, different 
firm and buyout sizes, and PE firms operating with varied processes. However, what implies 
a high level of transferability is the fact that the findings here are well in line with both the 
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previous literature on LBOs and literature dealing with planning and managing the post-deal 
phase in M&A transactions.  
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Appendix A: Summary of cases – pre-deal period 
Summary and comparison of studied cases – pre-deal period 
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Appendix B: Summary of cases – post-deal period 
Summary and comparison of studied cases – post-deal period 
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